

JPRS-NEA-92-130
5 OCTOBER 1992




**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980115 100

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

JPRS-NEA-92-130

CONTENTS

5 October 1992

POLITICAL

Internal Affairs

Profile of Peace Negotiator Yig'al Karmon [HA'ARETZ 28 Aug]	1
Profile of Prospective Autonomy Coordinator [HA'ARETZ 28 Aug]	2
Sharon Calls on Likud To Fight for Israel [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 30 Aug]	6
Kollek Support, Opposition Viewed [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 4 Sep]	7
Israeli Proposal to Palestinians Explored [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 2 Sep]	10
Call For Israeli Training of Palestinian Police [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 13 Aug]	11
Infrastructure of Gaza Settlements, Tourism [HA'ARETZ 3 Aug]	11
Jewish Acquisition of Property in East Jerusalem [HA'ARETZ 13 Aug]	12
'Hoopoe' Antiterrorism Unit Described [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 2 Sep]	13

ECONOMIC

Head of Israeli Microsoft Profiled [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 1 Sep]	15
Frenkel's First Year at Bank of Israel Assessed [HA'ARETZ 21 Aug]	16
Inflation-Unemployment Ratio in Economy Examined [HA'ARETZ 21 Aug]	18
Budget Problems of Qol Yisra'el External Service [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 13 Aug]	19
Funding of Development Towns, Settlements Debated [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 21 Aug]	21
Palestinians Seek West Bank Antiquities Control [HA'ARETZ 21 Aug]	22
Description of Negev Technology Park, Projects [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 4 Aug]	24

MILITARY

General 'Uzi Dayan, New Command Profiled [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 30 Aug]	26
New Gun for Artillery Corps Being Examined [HA'ARETZ 23 Jul]	27
Physical Training Standards in IDF Discussed [YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew]	29

Internal Affairs

Profile of Peace Negotiator Yig'al Karmon

92AE0634A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Aug 92
p B2

[Article by Orit Glili]

[Text] Yig'al Karmon, trusted aide of Yossi Ben-Aharon, who, during the previous round of talks, supplied the books used to provoke the Syrians, now finds himself outside the peace process, which he does not believe in anyway.

After Yossi Ben-Aharon, general director of the prime minister's office until two months ago, was replaced as head of the delegation to the peace talks with the Syrians, he approached Yitzhaq Rabin and those close to him and tried to convince them not to sack the man who was his closest aide in the delegation, his confidante and adviser, Yig'al Karmon. Karmon is still serving in the prime minister's office as adviser on terrorism, and last year was in the headlines and became the object of controversy as the person who drew attention to several tourist sites in foreign countries that it would be best for Israelis not to visit, for reasons of safety. "All right, I understand that you do not want me," Ben-Aharon said, "but leave him alone. There is no reason the reputation I have as an extremist should be extended to Karmon."

But this appeal did not help. To Rabin and his men, who have made almost no changes in the composition of the delegations to the peace talks, the symbolic action in the case of Ben-Aharon and Karmon was what was important—and why include an adviser on terror in a peace delegation anyway—to prove to the other side that those people who had been so true to the rejectionist approach toward the Arab side, are now outside the negotiation picture.

Karmon has been wounded to the depths of his heart by his removal from the delegation. "They are stigmatizing me," he said to close friends when the news of his replacement was published in the paper. "I simply administered the work of the delegation and I have no personal stands. Why do they think my opinions were the most extreme there? Everyone thought exactly the same thing."

These steps, with such a personal coloration, have, so far at least, proven themselves justified because since the present round of talks began in Washington, reports have been flowing out of there of an excellent atmosphere, of handshakes, of drinking coffee together: (in the previous round Ben-Aharon used to tell the media that the Syrians refused even to drink a cup of coffee with him, but he forgot to tell what happened before that—how in the conference hall he was busy the whole time provoking the other side); and even the Syrians had to admit that something had really changed, when the Israeli delegation's new chairman, Professor 'Itamar Rabinovitz,

declared that the principles of security council resolution 242 were acceptable to him as a basis for negotiations over the Golan Heights.

How can such a great change be explained? And, alternatively: how did we conduct ourselves at the talks until now? A little of what went on there was revealed in an interview HA'ARETZ had with Dr. Yossi Olmert—who participated only in the first two rounds of talks, until Ben-Aharon sent him home.

Olmert described how in the second session with the Syrians, Ben-Aharon took out Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tal'as's book about Zionism, *The Commands of Zion* (on the book's cover is the figure of a frightening old Jew, next to a basin filled with blood), and threw it down dramatically before the leader of the Syrian delegation, Dr. Maw'afak 'A'alaf. From Ben-Aharon's viewpoint, the point of this drama was to illustrate what Israel loves so much to stress—that there is no one to talk to.

Olmert told how this throwing of the book became a constant part of everyday life for the members of the delegation. At the end of a day of negotiations, they would meet in the bar of the Washington hotel, and practice hurling the book. There were even some who were very successful, throwing it almost as well as Ben-Aharon.

The idea of using Tal'as's book as an exhibit at the peace talks came from none other than Ben-Aharon's trusted aide, Yig'al Karmon. It was he who did the research for Ben-Aharon and prepared for him the informational groundwork that served later as the basis for provocation at the talks. With material like this, Karmon believed, it would be possible to make a frontal attack on the Syrians and be able to answer any Syrian attack with material twice as powerful. And so he diligently searched the anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist literature that had been published in Arab countries, and equipped Ben-Aharon with it to use as incriminating evidence.

When at one of the sessions, Ben-Aharon showed some Syrian school books in which Israel and Zionism were shown in a negative light, and then suddenly 'A'alaf suddenly pulled out in return an article by Tamar Meroz which was published several years ago in the HA'ARETZ supplement, about stereotypes in the way Arabs are portrayed in the Israeli school system. "But we have books!" Ben-Aharon insisted. "We are not relying on something written in the paper." Some members of the delegation, who preferred not to say anything then, were filled with a sense of pessimism over the way the talks were likely to go.

Karmon actually owes his appointment as adviser on terror to Yitzhaq Rabin. During the unity government, Ben-Aharon recommended Karmon to Yitzhaq Shamir. But in spite of his closeness to Ben-Aharon, Shamir did not want to hear of Karmon and said that he did not feel that he was suited to serve as an adviser. Karmon tried to use the influence on Rabin, the Defense Minister at that

time, through a family friend who was a member of the Rabin camp—Edna Soludar. But he is a Likudnik, Rabin said to Soludar. In the end, he recommended him to Shamir for the post.

Receiving the position was very important to Karmon at that time. This was meant to make up for the bad publicity he had received in the days of the village associations, an idea he tried to carry out at the time, together with the head of the civilian administration, Professor Menahem Milson. "I was badly burned during that time in Judaea and Samaria" Karmon used to say about himself in those days. At the beginning of next week, he is scheduled to report to Rabin, and a decision will be made on his future in the Prime Minister's office.

Karmon describes himself as a Zionist activist with very few feelings of guilt toward the Arabs. "The fact that I do not feel guilty," Karmon is accustomed to saying with pride, "shines from me, and is an inseparable part of that terrible rightist image. So what can I do?" But now he feels that he is paying dearly for his 25-year-old friendship with Yossi Ben-Aharon.

How did the Ben-Aharon and Karmon team work? First of all, with great thoroughness. Before every round of talks, they prepared not only papers, but an entire book. 'Itamar Rabinovitz, for example, made do with much less preparation. He did not even manage to read in depth the reports of earlier meetings. Ben-Aharon, with Karmon's help, tried before every meeting to zero in on which positions the Syrians were dead set on, and on which they might be more flexible about. On the one hand, according to the two, Ha'faz 'Al-'Asad had actually said that he was ready to negotiate without preconditions, and Shamir was excited about this—but later it became clear that there were preconditions. They prepared eight preliminary questions and it later became clear that most of them were things that caused the negotiations to constantly stall.

The two did not give all of the questions equal importance, but gave the impression that everything was important and crucial in their eyes. This made progress very difficult. At a certain point, the Americans tried to rescue the talks from the dead end with the help of what they called the "hypothetical method." Each side, they suggested, would tell the other what it would be prepared to do if it got what it wanted. Israel said that only if Syria was ready for a peace treaty would they be ready to talk about 242. Professor Rabinovitz did exactly the opposite. He said that he accepted 242 and everyone understood from this that he was talking about withdrawal. And even though he did say exactly that, he succeeded in to in the meantime in creating in the minds of those involved that psychological turning point that Ben-Aharon had not been able to achieve. Perhaps it was a little bit calculated, says one of the experts on Syria, but if Israel does not let the Syrians know soon that she really means to retreat, there will be no progress.

One major hurdle in the preliminary questions that Ben-Aharon and Karmon presented the Syrians with touched the question of recognizing the legitimacy of Israel and her right to exist, as a matter completely separate from the political and diplomatic recognition to come at the end of the process. The Syrians asked then what Israel they were supposed to recognize. You have a map to propose to us?" they asked. Karmon brought to that meeting an interview with Hesnin Heykhal (editor of "Al 'Ahrām" in the days of Nasser) who, when asked about a peace agreement with Israel with secure and recognized borders, answered that in his opinion, secure and recognized borders were one synagogue in Tel Aviv and a few meters around it. Karmon gave them Heykhal's article to look at and they brushed it away as nonsense. "Peace is not a treaty" they said

"Peace is a vision. It is a state of mind. **State of Mind: The Hebrew expression was given, and after the transliteration of the English words, "State of Mind."**

"What kind of maniacs are the Arabs?" said Karmon after the session, responding to the interpretation the Syrians and Jordanians give to the word "peace." "If they want is to escape from the treaty." Ben-Aharon completely shared this opinion of the Arabs. This week Karmon was heard saying that in his opinion, he and Ben-Aharon did miss any chance. Because it is a problem of positions and not people, and it was not they who were the problem.

In his eyes, there is no reason to appoint 'Itamar Rabinovitz in his place, because in the end, he will not succeed in changing anything either.

Profile of Prospective Autonomy Coordinator

92AE0634B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Aug 92
p 24-25, 27

[Article by 'Arye Dayan: "The Loneliness of the Major General"; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] If the autonomy talks in Washington lead to real decisions, the man who will carry them out will be Dani Yatom, major general of the Central Command. He has many rivals on the General Staff: officers who once were under him, or those who see him as a competitor for the position of commander in chief. They all agree that he is a very professional soldier, a real Prussian.

A few days after taking over as major general of the Central Command, Dani Yatom decided to make a gesture: he canceled the permanent curfew that his predecessor, Yitzhak Mordecai, had laid on several villages in the Nablus region. This was in March of 1991, less than a month after the Gulf war, three weeks after removal of the general curfew that had been imposed in the territories during the war. The curfew that continued in the villages near Nablus was therefore something left over from the war. It never occurred to the residents of

these villages, who felt from the beginning that the curfew was unjustified, to thank General Yatom for his generosity.

The new major general of the command saw this as ingratitude on their part; we heard from a someone who visited his office then that the things he said about the subject gave the impression that he was truly insulted. But anyone accustomed to the way of thinking of the Palestinians in the territories would understand that Yatom's feeling that he has been insulted is somewhat absurd.

A year and a half has passed since then, and Gen. Yatom has managed to learn well the topics he is responsible for. Now he is expert in the little details of the differences between Fatah, the Fronts, and Hamas (for example, that Hamas, unlike the Fronts, will probably participate in the autonomy elections, if they are held). In discussions with his officers and aides, he at least partly credits his own policies for the return to normal life in the territories: the Palestinians are sitting again in the coffee houses and eating in the restaurants, listening to happy music at weddings, and visiting the Kilkiliya Zoo or the new swimming pool in Hebron.

Two weeks ago, Gen. Yatom arrived at the new commercial center in Ram'alla and was invited to visit a nearby hall where a summer camp was being run, with 100 children. The director welcomed him; the counselors were friendly; the children sang a song in his honor. Yatom said to his aide when they left there, "six months ago, this could not have happened." But not only the Palestinians have changed; Gen. Yatom has also changed: this time he did not complain that they did not thank him for his diplomacy.

Among the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] present top brass, Dani Yatom has quite a few rivals. Some of them still hold against him his behavior toward them in the past; Yatom is a tough commander, demanding perfection from those under him and not compromising on discipline and procedure. He is capable, for instance, of returning a working paper to a senior officer even if the man has worked on it for days, because the text is not divided into paragraphs according to the rules. Yatom will bring officers to trial for what others might see as relatively minor negligence, and also says what he really thinks about anyone under him, openly, and in their presence.

Other top officers are thought to be his rivals for another reason: these are the officers who assume, as far as anyone can see, correctly, that Dani Yatom will compete with them for the position of chief of staff. Both of these groups have been trying over the last few years to paint a picture of Yatom as an officer lacking battle experience. Yatom, who apparently knows that their claims are not completely unfounded, often mentions the fact that when he served in the General Staff mobile headquarters, he took part in more actions across the border than any other officer.

Even Gen. Dani Yatom's critics admit that he is an intelligent man, who carries out his assignments thoroughly and to the letter. In all the positions he filled in the past, he proved his ability to pick up new topics quickly, no matter how complicated. On the other hand, his critics claim that he is overly sure of himself, to the point of arrogance, and this sometimes makes him indiscreet. Both his admirers and his opponents point out his fluent speech, his language so much richer than the style common among officers, his clear and precise formulations.

In the last few months, there have been three times where Yatom has been thrown into situations—where his superiors had cause to worry about his judgment. The first case was when he decided to close A-Nj'ah University and on the first day of the new government, almost caused a media-covered incident that could have cost Israel a great political price.

The second case was three weeks ago: three armed members of a Islamic extremist group penetrated the Jordan valley, ran into a group of soldiers, and wounded two of them. Yatom arrived at the spot immediately, and said something there that caused confusion among the political echelons just before the prime minister was to leave for Washington. Yatom declared that "the period of calm along the Jordanian border has ceased to exist," and there had been an "escalation, and intensification of infiltration attempts." Just a few hours later, another army higher up, who was identified simply as a "top officer," said as quickly as possible, that the Jordanians "have frustrated and continue to frustrate many attempts by terrorists to penetrate into Israeli territory, and frequently send conciliatory messages.

The third incident occurred four days later. IDF soldiers got into a confrontation with settlers who had set up an unauthorized structure outside Kiryat 'Arb'a. The negotiations with the settlers were carried on by Brigadier Moshe Ya'alon, who acted according to instructions communicated to him by Gen. Yatom. There are at least two versions of what went on during the meeting between Ya'alon and 'Elyakim Ha'atzani. The version of the settlers is that there were negotiations and in the end the two sides agreed that the settlers would leave the area, while the IDF would not destroy the structure they had erected.

The army's version is that there were no negotiations. Yatom, according to this version, instructed Ya'alon to say to Ha'atzani that the IDF would remove the settlers by force and even gathered the necessary forces to do it. At the same time, Yatom turned to the military attorney's office and heard from it that the structure should not be destroyed without an authorization from "the committee for authorizing demolition of structures." Only because of that, not as a result of negotiations with the settlers' representatives, did Yatom decide not to destroy the structure.

What will happen in the upcoming months if the political negotiations make progress, and the settlers carry out their threats to do what they can to undermine them? Some of the powers that be are doubtful that Gen. Yatom is the one suited to deal with this situation. Those who claim that Dani Yatom will not know how to deal with settler violence bring up the fact that even in the days when the settlers organized wild retaliatory raids on Hilul or B'al Bira, the IDF did not lift a finger to stop them. Yatom's critics also claim that it was not an accident that he won the title "Yakir Yesh" a—"Yakir=the beloved, the darling; yesh"=Yehudah and Shomron, or Judah and Samaria; i.e., the darling of Judah and Samaria; for he also supported setting up the civil guard in the settlements, stepped up the integration of the settlers into regional defense units, and helped them in civilian areas not included in his realm of responsibility.

Relations between the army and the settlers, which were not so good in the days of 'Amram Matzneva' and began to improve in Yitzhak Mordekhai's time, have become almost ideal in the days of Dani Yatom. The mayors of Judah and Samaria call him directly on the phone, even his car phone. In all his visits in Hebron he makes sure to visit the settlers, too. About a year ago they complained to him about what seemed to them like exaggerated concessions he was making to the Palestinian population: canceling the road blocks and taking down the observation posts in prominent places. In response, Yatom invited a group of representatives from the settlements for a guided tour of the undercover unit and their complaints completely disappeared.

Along with those who complain about Yatom, are also those who believe that he is really the one who knows best how to deal with possible settler violence, as a professional officer who always carefully carries out any policy that has been set. When he received instructions from Moshe 'Arens to show the greatest possible respect for the settlers' wishes while fighting the intifadah—he acted accordingly. If he had received other instructions—he would have acted differently. Those who make that claim can present examples to support it: Yatom ordered the confiscation of the weapons of a member of "Kakh" (the political party of the followers of former Knesset member, extreme rightist rabbi, the late Me'ir Kahane) Barukh Marzel, kept the Judah and Samaria council from holding an Independence Day march last year to a settlement site that had been erected especially, instructed his men to report to the police any deviant behavior on the part of the settlers, and also prevented the settlers from blocking the main roads in response to terrorist attacks.

Throughout his career, even after he joined the General Staff, Yatom has stayed away from involvement in things not directly connected with his defined duties, including the internal politics of the General Staff. Even when he served in the office of the defense minister, he did not rub shoulders with politicians, avoided cocktail

parties and receptions, and did not try to build connections for himself with powerful people, economically or otherwise, who could secure his future after his retirement. Those who are critical of him say he is like a Prussian officer; those who approve of him say he is like an American marine.

These qualities are not exactly a plus in Dani Yatom's present job; and indeed, when he took over the Central Command, there were those who had reservations about his ability to be flexible and politically sensitive. Simply carrying out orders to the letter, they said, is not a good quality for somebody who has to maneuver before the eyes of the world press between the Palestinian national leadership and the Judah and Samaria Council; an attempt to distance oneself from involvement in politics is likely to turn, in an area where every house is a political powder keg, and every stone moved is reported directly to the State Department, into a dangerous avoidance of reality.

It was Defense Minister Moshe 'Arens who decided to appoint Yatom general of the Central Command in December 1990, on the recommendation of Chief of Staff Dan Shomron. The deputy chief of staff at that time, 'Ehud Barak, who was already designated as the next chief of staff, was not enthusiastic over the appointment. He knew Dani Yatom well—he had been his commander in the General Staff mobile headquarters. Yatom, who wanted very much to follow Barak as commander of the mobile headquarters, was startled when after Barak left, another candidate, Giyora' Zorea', was chosen over him.

Dani Yatom has experienced other disappointments of this sort over the course of his career. He was first recommended as a candidate for general of the Central Command in 1989, when 'Amram Matzneva' was retiring; Defense Minister Rabin preferred Yitzhak Mordekhai to him. After that he hoped to be appointed chief of intelligence, but 'Uri Shagai' got the post. In December, 1990 he was appointed general of the Central Command precisely when he wanted to be general of the northern command. Defense Minister 'Arens preferred to send Yitzhak Mordekhai to the north. 'Ehud Barak, who knew that 'Arens had liked Yatom since the days when he served as his military secretary, did not oppose the appointment.

Dani Yatom was born 47 years ago in the 'Eyn Hatekhelet neighborhood, on the Netanya seafront. In the last few decades this neighborhood has become an integral part of the city of Netanya, but then it was a remote suburb, a group of small, modest houses with a population far from wealthy, made up of immigrants from a variety of countries.

The Yatom family, like the rest, was not especially wealthy; his father, a religious man who arrived from Romania before World War II, ran a fish store in Netanya and supported Dani, his sister, and two brothers from what it brought in. The name "Yatom" is

the hebraization of "Yusem," (the Yiddish pronunciation of "Yatom"); the father adopted the Hebrew version when he arrived in Palestine. Dani was an excellent student in all subjects at the Tschernikovski high school, particularly excelling in math and science. Even then he already began to show the characteristics that have followed him throughout his adult life: he was obedient, quiet, diligent in preparing homework, got no fun out of joining in pranks or wild behavior. Nevertheless he was pretty well liked by children his age, perhaps because he was so good at sports. His still keeps himself in shape, and his neighbors are accustomed to seeing him running through the streets at unconventional hours. Dani Yatom is married and the father of five children. The two oldest are soldiers in the regular army, and the youngest will be entering first grade in two weeks.

In twelfth grade Yatom had to decide whether to go to medical school through the academic reserves or join the regular army and serve in the General Staff mobile headquarters. In the end he chose the mobile headquarters. Twenty years later, when he did go to college, he took physics and math. As far as anyone knows, he is the only member of the General Staff, present or past, who chose, without his army position requiring it, to study these subjects.

Yatom ended his nine years of service in the General Staff mobile headquarters in the post of second-in-command to Ehud Barak, the commander of the mobile headquarters. Barak, as veterans of the unit remember those days, was the man with the brilliant ideas; Yatom, his second-in-command, put the ideas into action. Together, Barak and Yatom participated in the raid on Beirut airport; they saved the passengers of the Sabena jet at Ben Gurion airport. The famous photograph that recorded this event showed the two of them wearing white overalls, following each other across the wing of the jet.

When he left mobile headquarters, he was transferred to armor, and insisted on starting his tour there from the beginning, serving as a company tank commander when he was already a major. In the Yom Kippur War, the last time he was actually in battle, he was a deputy regiment commander in Dan Shomron's tank brigade. Yatom's regiment fought at the Gidi Pass and on the western bank of the Suez Canal, during the conquest of 'Abediya. He was recommended for a medal, but the committee awarding the decorations turned down the recommendation. Immediately after the fighting ended, he received command of the regiment. After that he was operations officer for the division, commander of a reserve brigade, and operations officer of the armored columns. He did not participate in Operation Litani because was taking an advanced course with the United States Army. When he returned to Israel, he was appointed head of the armored corp's section for development of tactics, and, after that, commanded the defense ministry's research and development unit. He was the first officer appointed to that post without having an engineering degree.

In 1983, when Moshe 'Arens was brought back from the embassy in Washington to take over the Defense Ministry after Ariel Sharon was dismissed, Yatom was appointed his military secretary. Binyamin Netanyahu, who had been 'Arens's deputy at the embassy, knew Yatom from their service together in the General Staff mobile headquarters, and recommended him to 'Arens. Yatom and 'Arens found a common voice. The military secretary helped the minister, who barely knew a thing about the IDF until then, to deal with generals who tried to exploit his inexperience to further personal interests, or the interests of their own branches over those of the army as a whole. 'Arens would remember the help Dani Yatom had been to him, when he returned to the Defense Ministry in 1990.

In the thirty years he has served in the IDF, Dani Yatom has succeeded in creating a name for himself as a very decent man. They say of him that he is "straight as an arrow," almost beyond belief. Only one cloud, perhaps not completely true, clouds this image, and it is connected to the Shin Bet (General Security Service) incident. [April 1984, when after the bus hijacking, two hijackers who survived were beaten to death by Shin Bet agents, and the incident was covered up.].

There are those who are convinced that Dani Yatom had a part in shifting the blame for the killing in the direction of Yitzhak Mordekhai.

In the 17 months that have passed since he took over as general of the command, at the Kfir fortress, Yatom has managed to get into several confrontations with Chief of Staff Barak. One of them occurred in the presence of a large number of officers and enlisted men, and happened a short time after Yatom and Barak took over their present posts. An armed band penetrated from Jordan into Israeli territory and reached the courtyard of one of the IDF outposts near Kibbutz Neve Or without being discovered.

In the investigation that Yatom conducted after the incident, in the presence of the chief of staff and with the participation of high officers of the command, a very bad picture was revealed: the reservists who manned the outposts in the sector had not received sufficient training, the guard posts that should have revealed the infiltration were neglected, and there was no real coordination between the commanders in the sector. Yatom, who had commanded in this post for only two and a half months, and apparently inherited the situation from his predecessor, found himself attacked by the chief of staff in front of his own senior officers. Barak did prefer to concentrate his public criticism on the way Yatom had handled the investigation, but his true intention was clear to everyone who witnessed the embarrassing situation. Afterwards, Barak also changed the practical decisions that Yatom had reached: the general had decided that one of the officers should receive a reprimand; the chief of staff canceled his decision and ordered that the officer be dismissed.

This ugly incident took place on the background of another confrontation more fundamental, which followed the two since they had taken over their posts. One of the first instructions the chief of staff had given the generals of the commands was to cut down considerably the size of the forces stationed in the territories. Barak's instructions came out of his own sense of priorities: preparing the army for war was more important than struggling with the intifadah, and therefore—according to his approach—the fight against the intifadah should be handled first and foremost by the special units. Matan Vilna'i, general of the southern command, followed the chief of staff's orders immediately and without objection. Dani Yatom did not do so.

Yatom did not oppose using the special units but rejected the order to cut down the rest of the forces active on the West Bank. Those who know him point out in this context that he is an obedient officer, but also will do everything possible to change an order that seems wrong to him. This time he made use of 'Arenss' visit to the territories. The cutback that the chief of staff demanded, said the area commander to the defense minister, will make the struggle against the intifadah more difficult. The things were said in the presence of deputy chief of staff 'Amnon Shahak, who was in the room. The practical result: the cut back of forces stationed in the West Bank was slowed down considerably.

On the surface, relations between Dani Yatom and 'Ehud Barak are completely in order. The chief of staff gives public approval to all decisions the general makes, defends the way he runs the "Cherry" patrol, and even sent his second-in-command Shahak to respond on "Mabat" to the CNN report showing the undercover raid on the village in the West Bank.

But sharp listeners can already distinguish some rustlings at the top, of discomfort at Yatom's behavior. About a month ago, a Black Panther activist was killed in Jenin. Yatom forbade the family to bury him in the village. The refusal aroused anger in the territories and the national leadership, led by Faysal Huseyni and Han'an 'Ashra'vi, were about to call a press conference and accuse Israel of being "afraid of the dead, too." Coalition Knesset members who heard from Huseyni of his intention tried in vain to change Yatom's decision. At last they turned to Yitzhak Rabin. Less than two hours later, the head of Rabin's office reported that the defense minister had decided to allow the man to be buried in his village.

It is possible that the leak published last week over "Kol Yisra'el" also reflects discomfort with the way Yatom carries out his duties, at least in everything connected with the way he utilizes the "Cherry" units (see box [not reproduced]).

Karmela Menashe, the radio's military correspondent, reported that the chief education officer, together with the general of the southern command, Matan Vilna'i, set up a team that will work as part of the "Samson"

units—the undercover unit of the southern command—in order to raise their awareness of the principle of purity of arms. It seems clear enough that the main aim of the leak was to praise General Vilna'i, but the rest of the report emphasized that the general of the Central Command had still not decided whether to set up a similar team within the "Cherry" units. Whoever leaked the story, with both its parts, was apparently trying to suggest something to Gen. Dani Yatom.

Photo Captions, p. 27

Right: a visit to the open market: the general no longer has unrealistic expectations.

Left: Dani Yatom: sometimes the accelerated procedure for opening fire is justified.

Sharon Calls on Likud To Fight for Israel

91AE0641F Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT in Hebrew
30 Aug 92 p 19

[Article by 'Ari'el Sharon: "On the Brink of Collapse"]

[Text] Last week, in one 24-hour period, the following news echoed throughout our media and the West: the Prime Minister had decided to release 800 terrorists from prison; 'Arafat announced a continuation of the terror; terrorist homes that had been sealed would be reopened; alleyways from which terrorists had surged were to be reopened; Arab movement from the territories to Israel would be eased. On the other hand, the house built by Jews on Giv'at Harsinah, which is in Hebron, would be destroyed; the areas of Mount Judea and Qiryat 'Arba' were declared closed military territory (only to Jews); about 50 Jews who tried to get to Giv'at Harsinah were arrested. Following that, the prime minister instructed that the expulsion orders against 11 of the terrorist leaders be cancelled.

The sounds of leftist rejoicing at the opening of the alleyways in Gaza had not yet subsided when an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldier was attacked there with a knife. And before we had digested the ridiculous explanations of how the release of the terrorists would improve the atmosphere in the "territories," we learned of the fall of an outstanding fighting officer from the Border Police.

This is here. In Washington our representatives in the various discussion groups are competing with each other as to who can make more concessions; the competition is fierce and all one-sided. The concessions are all ours; the demands, all theirs.

We heard the devious announcement of the retreat on the Golan Heights: "We will not leave the Golan Heights," says Rabin. "We will carry out Resolution 242 on all the borders," his aides continue. And "we do not have to hold on to every centimeter," Rabin adds. Those who saw the smiling faces of the Syrians do not need any more of Rabin's deviousness. The Golan Heights people

are confused. They were Rabin's supporters on the eve of the election; they are his first sacrifices today. Before the elections—fraud; after them—deceit.

On the same day, a vote in the Knesset following my demand to discuss the attacks on the Jewish settlers in the old city of Jerusalem. The proposal to hold a plenary Knesset discussion lost by a vote. Six of the Likud Knesset members were absent from the plenary auditorium at precisely the time of the discussion of the heart, for thousands of years, of the Jewish people, the heart of the problem—Jerusalem.

And you ask yourself, then what does interest them if not Jerusalem? What do several of the people do there? Why do they exist in political life? At a time when Jews are prevented from living in the Old City, at a time when a Jewish government that has strayed from the Zionist path is getting ready to tear down a Jewish house in Hebron. At a time when Jews are forced to travel on messed up highways in Samaria, and traffic is routed through crowded Arab villages on the presumption that the fear on the part of the Jewish mothers who drive alone, with their babies at their side, of stones and Molotov cocktails, will increase. In the veiled hope that they will want to abandon their living quarters and "retreat" to the crowded coastal plain. At a time when the Golan Heights are in danger, what are they doing?

I initiated the founding of Likud in 1973, and it is dear to me. But the Likud will have no right to exist if these kinds of things recur. If the Likud does not get itself together immediately, as one man, at the head of the struggle to defend the Land of Israel, then why does it exist?

This is the only real struggle, and it is there that the various contestants need to concentrate. In the face of the dangers, the serious problems, any confrontation that is not mainly about Jerusalem, about the integrity of the country and about the security of the lives of Israeli citizens, is a mockery.

What is happening now in the security, political and settlement areas is no longer an erosion in Israeli positions, but a collapse.

From minute to minute it turns out that there is no longer anyone on whom to rely. The prime minister is simply unable to stand his ground. Control over the processes is slipping away from him.

Hence I have warned the members of Likud, not for the first time, that we must put our heads together to shorten the life of this government, lest it be too late.

Kollek Support, Opposition Viewed

91AE0641D Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 4 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by 'Anat Tal-Shir: "They Are All Waiting for Teddy"]

[Text] The legend known as Teddy Kollek is deeply perplexed. It is a longstanding situation in which the mayor of the capital of the Jewish people is torn between leaving and staying. Things are complicated, and the conflicts are between the pressure of biological age and the new political situation that has prevailed in Jerusalem since the coup of 1992.

Kollek is divided between love of Jerusalem, which knows no bounds, and the feeling that he has to leave the arena, to prepare an heir and hand over the keys to that successor.

Like a divine artist on stage, Kollek has given the concert, and it was an amazing solo performance that stretched over the last three decades. The audience extracted encore after encore, and the real question is whether Kollek will give yet another encore. Will he bow to the pressures to finish his present term and not retire before its conclusion, and perhaps even run for the next term, which would find him at the age of 83. Those close to him agree that he is somewhat frail and has slowed down a bit, but even in his twilight, he is so much better than the others that there is no comparison.

While he was dealing with his daily hubbub and the retirement dilemma, the battleground for the city's mayoralty contest began to heat up last week. The scenario in which Kollek chooses to retire, has created a brouhaha in the city, and there are those who believe that this time the mayor of mythic proportions will really go home. In recent years he has only threatened to leave, but this time there is fear that he will actually do it. The arena will remain wide open to any assault, and here the possible scenarios multiply. Will Teddy appoint an heir when he leaves, will the man he crowns win the city's elections, who among the unemployed in Likud will announce for the race, who must Labor put up against 'Ari'el Sharon, etc.?

In the coming weeks Kollek will make his decision and he will make it alone. If the mayoralty elections take place in November 1993, the parties will have to put up their candidates within a month in order to allow the candidate to get organized during the year.

When I Make Up My Mind, I Will Make an Announcement

There is demonstrable caution here. No one has defeated Kollek and no one will. They know that in both parties. In the past candidates who declared against him have been burned. Some of them even tried, and they all suffered humiliating defeats. Therefore, until Kollek sets a firm retirement date, no one will risk declaring his candidacy. But ferment can be felt below the surface, despite the fact that elections are 14 months away. It may be that the elections will only be held in 17 months, in February 1994, if it should be decided to be meticulous about five years from the date of the previous elections.

Here Kollek is interviewed, sharp, vital, and impatient as is his wont. He is annoyed about the fact that people speak for him, and to calm the nation he says: "I am healthy and intact, and when I make up my mind I will make an announcement; all of those who are spouting off do not know anything. All the talk about retirement before the end of my term is premature. I have not set any date and have not yet completed my missions in the city."

Is there any constellation of events in which you would choose to run in the 1993 elections?

"No. I do not think a man my age has to run for this job. At election time I will be 83, and I am supposed to commit to five years. At that age, can anyone commit for five years?"

Re'uven Rivlin, formerly a member of Likud, is weighing the submission of his candidacy if and when, and this is what he has to say about Kollek: "Teddy will serve to the year 2000. I am sure of that. He does not trust anyone to run the celebrations of Jerusalem's 3,000th anniversary. He reminds me of my North African friend who says: 'Keep me so I do not kill you.' That is how Teddy is. He says: 'They are pressuring me' and runs for another term because activity is vital to him, and if he retires he will wither. Because of the caprice of an aging man, he may bring a situation upon himself in which his old age embarrasses his youth. I would suggest appointing him king of Jerusalem. Citizen No. 1. President of the city."

Out of fear for what he terms "a continuation of the sane administration of the city," Kollek has entangled himself in a confusing web that is almost irreversible. He pointed to 'Amos Mar-Haim, the deputy mayor, as his preferred successor. Kollek entrusted the purse strings to him, granted him authority, and hoped that the miracle would happen and the halo of charisma would suddenly sprout on Mar-Haim.

That was how things were before the 1992 elections, before the Likud ministers found themselves out of work. As of the summer of 1992, with the Likud party confused and torn asunder, several of the ex-ministers will try to capture the city's mayoralty. Possibly not so much out of a feeling of exalted ministry as out of a desire to come away from the confusion with a powerful and prestigious stronghold. The names of three former ministers are mentioned: 'Ariel Sharon, 'Ehud 'Olmert, and Moshe Nissim. Their candidacy is relevant only if and when Kollek retires. Even sharks like they would not dare run against him and risk defeat.

In this context Kollek said: "Actually I heard that they are very bright fellows, and I am almost sure that Jerusalem is a way station for them. But since Likud lost the elections, they are ready to do us a favor and take over administration of the city."

Mar-Haim has worked alongside Kollek for the last three years. Despite the fact that Kollek declared him his heir,

the barrier of anonymity has not been breached and he has not captured the city. He had opportunities to prove that he is worthy of the crown, for example, in the snow campaigns, or the crisis in the Muslim quarter, but Mar-Haim missed those moments, he did not stick out and did not build himself up as a successor.

Mar-Haim is pleasant and cultured, but lacks leadership, is hesitant, and lacks charisma. He managed Kelel Industries and served formerly as General Manager of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Basically he is a consensus person, always looking for compromises and trying to please everyone. When the shooting starts, said a senior source at city hall, Mar-Haim is in the shelter, not at the front. Kollek is troubled by his compromising nature. In his view, someone strong and firm is needed to confront the sea of problems that this city creates.

He is so lacking the Kollek personality that mixes an abundance of magic, a stormy temperament, wild charm, world-embracing activism, the ability to fight, to insult, and to annoy—and at the same time to be beloved and appreciated. Despite his proven ability in organization and administration, Mar-Haim is not successful in creating massive chairs of support. He has no staff, camp, or party behind him.

He Can Roast Hummus

"We understand that there is not and will not be another Teddy," a member of the city council said, "but we are not prepared to support his absolute opposite." Kollek has also come to understand that the city is not a monarchy, and his signal is not enough to establish Mar-Haim as mayor. Mar-Haim has to stand for election, and the situation has become more complicated now that it is clear that Likud will put up former ministers.

Kollek is thus faced with the possibility of paving Mar-Haim's road to the top. He considered retiring at the end of the term so as to allow him to be seen as a leader, and thus give him an advantage over other candidates. But for the time being Kollek is worried about whether Mar-Haim could defeat 'Ariel Sharon and whether his (Kollek's) course of action might bring about a palace coup in Jerusalem.

The risk in this course of action is that after the Teddy era, anyone who takes his place is likely to be seen as a pale replacement. Kollek: "I am willing to listen to criticism of 'Amos only from those who can propose someone better. 'Amos will be dedicated to this for the rest of his life, he is an upright Jerusalemite with good qualities, and in a short time people will recognize that."

A brief profile of 'Amos Mar-Haim: "I am not the ideal candidate, but I do not know many people who have all the right talent and are ready to take on the job.

Charisma? I know people who had as much charisma as a zip-code directory, yet when they took up a public position they became stars. The one who is crazy about

this whole business is I. You have to be crazy to put on Teddy's shoes because the comparison will never flatter me. If there is a better candidate than me, then, by all means, let him jump in the race tomorrow morning."

Likud is praying for Mar-Haim's candidacy. A survey published in November 1991 in the local paper "Jerusalem" gave him an advantage only over Yehoram Ga'on.

Rivlin is suggesting a public opinion poll to determine who has a chance of beating any Labor candidate. But his party is still reeling from defeat, and ideas are hard to surface. Those who elected Rivlin in Likud ousted him, as you recall, from the Knesset, and he is now fighting for the job of treasurer of the Agency. 'Olmert acted aggressively for his election, among other things, to get him out of the way in the battle for the city's mayoralty. They say that 'Olmert went to him with the suggestion that he be No.2 on the list. Rivlin fainted from happiness, but refused with loathing. His prospects are not good if you remember that his party does not suffer losers. He is well-known in the city and understands its struggles but suffers from a certain inferiority for being from the Levi camp and also because in the Likud branch in the capital, he made more enemies than friends.

'Ari'el Sharon, according to leaks from his confidants, is looking seriously at the idea of capturing the city. Actually, he is organizing for the battle for top dog, but if he should get signals from the field that he has no chance in the campaign for Likud leadership, he will instruct his troops in the communications net to change direction from Metzudat Ze'ev at the top of the Qastel to Jerusalem. He can sweep the ultra-Orthodox votes and the slice of voters on the radical right. His great fear is his neighbors, the inhabitants of the Muslim quarter, and the 50,000 other Arab voters. They produced low voter turnout in the era of the intifadah, but clearly Sharon's candidacy would stir them from their complacency and push them to the voting box to vote for the candidate of the left.

On the surface 'Olmert's situation would seem to be better. He has nothing to look for in the battle for Likud leadership, and his gamble is less dangerous. If he loses the race for mayor, he will always be able to return to his flourishing business in the law office in which he is a partner in Jerusalem. He is the youngest (46) and the most energetic among the real Likud candidates, but he has no camp or soldiers in the field. He is wealthy, and his greatest asset is his excellent ties to the world's rich, which he established while in public office. Therefore it will not be hard for him to raise contributions to finance a remarkable campaign.

He is a Jerusalemite with deep roots in the city, and despite his natural conceit, he can roast hummus on the spit and crack sunflower seeds on the Betar platform in Jerusalem. Likud will stress his organizational prowess, his success in business, his warm family, his princely record, and his outside ties. Labor will point out the delicate and sophisticated balancing act between his

public duties and his private business. They would agree in Likud that a certain cloud hangs over that thin line. For the time being, 'Olmert is reflecting, consulting, waiting for the pressures and keeping his silence.

Among the three former ministers, Nissim has the weakest prospects. Indeed, he has an army, but it is a poor army because Nissim (in contrast to 'Olmert and Sharon) never was involved with money, with being a treasurer or with gathering contributions. In Likud they joke that he will not even have the money to publish the first poster announcing his campaign. He takes comfort in the fact that Jerusalem is his stronghold, and now he is also making himself known in the streets in the driving lessons that he was forced to take after the loss of his driver and Volvo. He could sweep the religious and Sephardi public, but there is a grayish cast obscuring all of his qualities, like his popularity and his amicability.

The rules of the game will change completely if Bin-yamin Netanyahu or Beni Begin should drop out of the race for Likud leadership and run for mayor. Labor is likely to lose control in the city if it does not field an attractive enough candidate. Out of this panic and uncertainty, two names have surfaced: Nahman Shai, former IDF spokesman, our national symbol in the Gulf war, and General Yitzhaq Mordekhai.

From another direction, which looks less gimmicky, the name Meron Benveniste pops up, the historian and reporter, who was Kollek's deputy at City Hall. He has many hours of Teddy behind him and innumerable arguments with him, the result of the difference in their temperament and age. Benveniste says he wants to be mayor, but there is no way he would run against Kollek.

Nissim's Poor Army

Recently it was learned that Shim'on Peres has proposed 'Avihu ben Nun as the Labor candidate. The best thing that could happen to Jerusalem, Peres told a municipal forum of his backers held in his office, would be Avihu ben Nun. Peres' suggestion was forwarded to Rabin, but no formal appeal was made to Ben Nun. The reserve general has settled into the offices of a car importer, from where it is reported that he is not interested in addressing the issue.

Kollek: "I do not know where that popped up from. He was not a Jerusalemite, never even served in Jerusalem, and today I do not feel there is a great advantage in generals. Let him be president of the country."

Among the abundance of candidates, we must mention Yehoram Ga'on, who declared this week that in another 10 years he would be mayor of Jerusalem. For the time being, Mar-Haim is the only candidate who offers the city his years without seeing it as a springboard. Like Kollek, he has sworn allegiance to the city of his birth to a ripe old age. Jerusalem is not a quarantine, he says, and not just a stop-gap job. It is prestigious and carries

enormous weight because of its international status and the political process. Is it any wonder that a battle is forecast there this year?

Meanwhile Kollek is successfully maneuvering with an amazing coalition in the Council. He moves mountains with no one to stop him. It is a strange city that maintains the trinity of faiths like the triple mold of the Knesset elections: a third to the national camp, a third to the ultra-Orthodox and a third to the camp of the left. The job announcement calls for a mayor who eats up all those troubles for breakfast, sets up a stadium, shopping center and zoos at noon, and at midnight, when he gets back home, finds an evicted family camped out on the sidewalk, as actually happened to him this week.

Kollek's passion is a Nobel prize for peace, and he still has not despaired of his desire to serve as Minister for Jerusalem affairs in the Rabin government. Not for the power, but out of a need to keep busy. Rabin actually is afraid of overinflating his government, but the idea has still not gotten a final rejection. It is felt that in the coming weeks he will officially ask Kollek to stay on to the end of his term and not retire prematurely.

A few months ago 'Elisha Peleg, an opposition Likud Council member, asked him if he would run for another term. Kollek said: Who would be crazy enough to elect an 83-year-old man as mayor? Peleg said: the same ones who elected him when he was 78.

Rabin toured with him this week in Jerusalem, on the opening day of the school year. Afterward the prime minister related in a small forum that he had suggested Kollek run for another term. How did he react, someone asked? He loved it, Rabin said.

Israeli Proposal to Palestinians Explored

91AE0641A Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT in Hebrew
2 Sep 92 p 19

[Article by Nahum Barne'a: "A Funny Thing Happened to Rabin on the Way to 'Arafat"]

[Text] One of the illusions of the election period was that changes in government would bring about change in the order of national hypocrisy. A new government would be born, honest and true and liberated from all the baggage of feigned saintliness that characterized the outgoing government.

Now we have a new government and, like its predecessor, it has been forced to carry on important negotiations with the PLO authorities in Tunis, and, like its predecessor, it refuses to admit it. In a certain sense, the hypocrisy gap has even widened because the Palestinians have stopped downplaying the bond between them and Tunis. Husayni is photographed with 'Arafat, and 'Ashrawi, with Nabil Sha'at, the top man in the Tunis delegation in Washington. When there is disagreement within the delegation, they all travel openly to PLO headquarters for clarification and decision.

There were officials in Israel who believed that the territorial elders would rebel at a certain stage against the PLO and make a separate agreement with the Israeli Government. That belief is now evaporating. It turns out that the representatives from the territories are caught between the fear of Hamas and the internal terror on the one hand and the dictates out of PLO-Tunis, on the other. If the Rabin government wants to arrive at an agreement, the final address is Tunis, not Gaza or Shekhem. Most of its ministers and officials are aware of this reality. They are less aware of the fact that many Israelis, on the right as well as the left, long ago reconciled themselves to the fact that it means the PLO. The story of the two-legged Nazi beast that we would never talk to, is over and done with. The Israelis are not fools. They understand whose words 'Ashrawi mouths.

Last week it was possible to see in Washington the price that the process is paying for the burden of hypocrisy. Nabil Sha'at decided to declare war on the Israeli proposal. The Israelis could not respond to him—not even in the media—because they were forbidden to recognize his existence. They could not even soften his position. If, instead of sitting in a hotel and complaining about Rubinshtayn, Sha'at were to sit at the State Department and discuss things directly with Rubinshtayn, they could all have left as winners.

Rubinshtayn submitted a 33-page pamphlet to the Palestinians. At first glance the document looks impressive, the fruit of a big legal effort on his part and that of his group of officials. At second glance it reads as a singularly successful conglomeration of the essential and the trivial, of substance and distortion. The suggestion is warmed-over Shamir. More than disappointing the Palestinians, it should upset those who elected Yitzhaq Rabin. Israel is offering them a highly plausible tangled web.

Rabin committed himself to reaching an agreement of self-rule, but he did not commit himself to parroting the distorted concepts of the previous governments. Menahem Begin signed an autonomy model at Camp David that he copied from the writings of Jabotinsky. That kind of autonomy, in which the Jews lead and the Arabs are led, in which the government patronizes the obedient, grateful natives, in which "the Arab, the Christian, and the Jew live happily," has never succeeded anywhere in the world. Those who go that route seriously, invite a second Lebanon or Yugoslavia or Georgia. The trick is to separate, to reduce friction as much as possible. That was also the message that Rabin got from those who elected him, from Bat-Yam to Nazareth; the time has come to separate the antagonists: they to their God, and we, to ours.

The Israeli proposal was not supposed to be "generous." Since when are we generous? Since when are they? The proposal was supposed to serve the interest of the State of Israel according to the understanding of the Labor party. Israel has no interest in acting the patron of Arab commerce, agriculture, roads, taxation, health. We are

not a caring family, and they, an abandoned child. Apart from foreign affairs and defense, and mutual coordination on matters such as water usage, we should have nothing to do with them.

The Israeli proposal is very wordy, but there is not a single word about the ownership of state lands. That kind of approach suited the Likud government, which considered state lands a reserve for Jewish settlement. Not so, Likud and Meretz. Had their proposal matched their true approach, it would have been formulated thusly: "All state lands apart from those on the confrontation line and those held today by Jewish settlements will be turned over to the self-rule administration." That way the government would have stopped, once and for all, the spread of the settlers. If and when it should yield its place to Likud, it could take comfort in the fact that it did one thing that was irreversible.

Call For Israeli Training of Palestinian Police

92AE0591D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 13 Aug 92 p 23

[Article by Brigadier-General (Reserves) S. Erez: "Who is Afraid of the Autonomy's Police"]

[Text] From newspaper reports, contact between representatives of the Palestinian delegation, Jordan, and the PLO have been recently revealed in connection with the establishment of a large police force for the future autonomy. Even the Camp David accords determine that "a strong, local police force will be established" in the framework of "arrangements for preserving the internal and external security, as well as public security."

This matter is seemingly viewed as a threat to Israeli security, but, in essence, the Government of Israel has an interest in the establishment of an independent police force in the territories that would preserve public order precisely in that period of instability and, in view of the anticipated events, during the organization of the configuration of the autonomy.

The realization of autonomy will be accompanied by violent power struggles between the various Palestinian groups. Struggles that will take place not only between supporters of the process and those opposed, such as Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Popular Front, but also as a result of internal quarrels within Fatah. It is reasonable to assume that this inter-Palestinian violence will become expressed with the use of firearms.

The transfer of upholding the law from the Israeli security forces to a Palestinian police force will compel the Palestinians to deal with issues that symbolized the focal points of confrontation with the Israeli Government, despite the fact that they constitute the foundations for public order in a proper society. For instance, aid for municipal authorities in the enforcement of tax collecting, effecting the implementation, physical enforcement of construction laws, as well as conducting

investigations and arrests of violent factors opposed to autonomy, detaining them in detention centers, and the administration of prisons for felons. The Palestinian police would be responsible for also preserving the internal security and the protection of the autonomy's institutions—courts, police stations, municipalities, and more. And all this, in addition to routine policing jobs.

Equipping the Palestinian police would be necessary for these assignments and for the problems with which they will have to deal. Therefore, it will be necessary to enable them to be armed with light weapons and to ensure their mobility in Jeeps and with communications equipment.

Without an effective Palestinian police force, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and the Israeli police will be forced to continue to deal with policing assignments and the application of force in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, even after the implementation of autonomy, since it is reasonable to assume that the growing violence and crime will result in anarchy, will harm the Israeli settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and will overflow into Israel, itself.

The Israeli police, within the framework of its role in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, has trained, through the years, dozens of Palestinian police officers who have acted in accordance with the law and the standing orders of the Israeli police, worked with its chiefs, and were able, therefore, to maintain the necessary coordination between the two police departments. If these officers were to be integrated into the new police force and were to accept a command over it, it would benefit both sides. If not, the gangs will reign over the Palestinian police and they will make use of the power given to them against us.

Therefore, it is important that the Israeli police propose to aid the Palestinians in the establishment of a police force, in its organization, training, and equipping according to the Israeli configuration.

Infrastructure of Gaza Settlements, Tourism

92AE0591A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Aug 92
p B1

[Article by A. Tal: "A Guest in Another Country"]

[Text] There are two types of "intifadah dodgers," on the ground and in the sky. It is possible to also reach Gush Qatif by air without passing the land of the intifadah or near it. Arkia aircraft (for 15, 25, or 50 passengers, as needed; cost of a one-way flight is 52 shekels) land three times a week at the Neve Deqalim landing ground. From above, Gaza and the refugee camps appear less threatening. There is even a certain beauty in the conglomeration of the structures, which seem like giant honeycombs. From high above and far away one is impressed by the intensive agriculture and by the vast distribution of greenhouses. But the pastoral tranquility of the scenery does not suppress thoughts of that which is occurring, perhaps at this very moment, down below.

After 35 minutes we land at the Neve Deqalim landing ground, as if in another country.

The managers of the Neve Deqalim Hotel, a few minutes' drive from the landing ground, are now making efforts to renovate and reconstruct it from a business aspect. Luckily, the hotel, which stands on one of the prettier beaches in Israel, is in the heart of a blue-golden-green tranquility. New promoters are getting ready to take it over, after redeeming it from receivership, and they hope that it will become an attraction among more than the religious. Now, in season, with a 45-percent occupancy rate on weekdays and 100-percent on weekends, the hotel is popular, primarily among those who keep kosher and do not need lifeguard services on the Sabbath.

The excursion is taking place a few days after the publication of the "Fu'ad decrees." If the district leaders are worried, they do not seem so. According to them, all of the construction is in advanced stages and will not be halted, and among the dozens of candidates for joining the various settlements, there are no cancellations. Of the more distant future, they are not eager to speak. The chairman of regional council of the Gaza coast, Tzvi Handel, was supposed to participate in the excursion, but he did not arrive, perhaps because of the fury of troubles of these times.

Council representatives want to talk primarily of the development of tourism, as the Hassidic Song Festival approaches in the middle of the month, to convince the public that there is something to see and do in the Gush, and that there is no fear of intifadah attacks. In order to reduce the danger of those leaving the Gush and of those entering it by land, a longed for six-kilometer-long road was paved, connecting the Gaza-Rafah road with the Sa'ad road to the east, and it then joins the Gaza-Ashqelon road near Yad-Mordekhai—bypassing the Gaza strip; a little longer, a lot safer.

A visit to a few of the settlements in the Gush at times makes one forget the fact that the visitor is in the midst of the Gaza strip, and that the feared Han Yunis is but a few dunams southeast of here.

In the two decades of settlement here, the dunes here have become flowering gardens. Not that the resources were lacking—the opposite. Underground water is found close to the surface of the ground, and the local residents developed the mawasi agriculture, planting without irrigation, and area plants that are based on water drawn from the depth of a meter or two. The [Jewish] settlers added the greenhouses, the knowledge, and lastly, the water of the national conduit, to compensate for the wells that became salinated from the fury of over-drawing water in the Gaza strip. More than many settlers in Judaea and Samaria, in the "sleeping settlements" that are more or less near the Green Line, Gush residents not only live in their settlements, but also have acquired land.

In conversations with the settlers, they did not make mention of their neighbors. They are trying to base themselves on Jewish labor, and contact with the Palestinians is minimal. On the colorful tourism map that the council published, which includes the 16 district settlements, Gaza, Rafah, and Han Yunis are not designated as settlements; their names were printed in reduced letters in the appropriate geographical areas, as if to warn: Travel is not recommended along this axis.

It is impossible not to admire the giant greenhouses (60 dunams) of Bnai 'Atzmonah—the settlers insist on Mitzpeh 'Atmonah—in which they are growing, using ingenious methods, but in accordance with Jewish law, ornamental plants for marketing in Israel, as well as flowers, geranium blossoms, and bonsai trees for export. Everything is extremely effective, scientific, and in accordance with Jewish law (on the ground of the greenhouses, thick sheets of plastic are spread, and thus the greenhouse is turned into a "house" and is exempt from the laws of shemittah. From the very restricted business information volunteered by the host, one understands that business here is flourishing—in the full sense of the word. By the way, even the vegetable business, especially tomatoes for export, in other settlements is doing well, thank you very much.

Nevertheless, here and elsewhere, in 12 of the Qatif settlements (three additional ones are situated at the north end of the Gaza strip, and one is in its center)—perhaps just because the pleasant, but modest, houses so incomparable to the "five minute" settlements in Samaria, the greenery, order, and cleanliness—the visitor, even if it is his first visit to the Gush, feels a sharp sense of having been here before. The feeling becomes stronger and clearer in the greenhouses of Bnai 'Atzmona, when a moshav member explains the origin of the settlement's name, which is the only one in the district whose founders are refugees of Yamit and, more precisely, refugees of Moshav 'Atzmona, which was abandoned there. The similarity between the moshavs of Yamit and the moshavs of Qatif arouses depressing reflection, which is certainly not foreign to those who have had a bitter experience.

In the regional center of Neve Deqalim, the Yamit yeshiva has been rebuilt. The modern facility suffers from simplistic and awkward symbolism: The front interior wall is built as a giant Shield of David; only by viewing from the outside can one discern that its sixth side is driven deeply into the ground. For whoever has not understood by himself, there is an accompanying explanation: This is a sign that from here we will not uproot ourselves again.

Jewish Acquisition of Property in East Jerusalem
92AE0591C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Aug 92
p 2

[Report by N. Shargay on interview of Shmu'el Me'ir: Topic of the Day With Shmu'el Me'ir: "We Will Do Everything To Burn Out a Fuse Here"; place and date not given]

[Text] [HA'ARETZ] How do all of you assess the decision to completely cease government budgeting?

[Me'ir] We will shortly embark on a large fund-raising campaign among the world Jewry, with the slogan: "Redemption of the land in Jerusalem." Every Jewish child and every Jewish family in the world will be partners in the building of Jerusalem. We have begun to work with the Jewish youth organizations in the United States. The settlement of Jews in the Old City, and in all sections of Jerusalem, will not cease. The government may do as it likes, but the people will not relinquish Jerusalem or parts of it.

[HA'ARETZ] Who are the heavy contributors?

[Me'ir] Good Jews from France, the United States, and throughout the world who do not wish to be revealed. With many of them, it is a matter of business. The Shafraad Hotel and Beyt Orot, for example, were purchased by Irvin Moskovitz.

[HA'ARETZ] Will the government's decision hurt you?

[Me'ir] The decision is not significant with regard to land and structures in the eastern part of the city that is outside of the walls. It is no problem to bring investors there. The more problematic part, at the moment, are the hovels within the Old City, which are in a terrible state. It is difficult to convince a Jew from Miami to buy ruins that only people as crazy as we will renovate. But, I believe that at the moment that this government goes into matters more deeply, there will be an agreement with us on 90 percent of our activities in Jerusalem.

[HA'ARETZ] There are those in the government who talk of the possibility of removing you from properties belonging to the state, in which you are already dwelling, and of drastically raising the rent that you pay.

[Me'ir] Whoever wants war will get a war. We prefer talk.

[HA'ARETZ] There have been reports of harassments from which your Arab neighbors have been suffering.

[Me'ir] This is bullshit. When there is no media, relations are excellent. If there is any harassment, it comes actually from Arabs to whom it has become clear that their neighbor is conducting negotiations over the sale of his house, and then they make it hell for him. To get out of it, he usually runs to the media and tells them that the Jews are harassing him.

[HA'ARETZ] It is a problem to convince an Arab to sell his house?

[Me'ir] Currently, many more want to sell than we are able to buy. What does a man need with his hovel in the Old City? He is not an idealist. He prefers to get the money and buy himself a spacious house outside the walls.

[HA'ARETZ] Do you not feel that you are entering into their soul? Is it not preferable to separate dwellings

between Arabs and Jews? You, after all, would not like to see Arab neighbors in your home in Qiryat Moshe.

[Me'ir] It is a free market. In Qatmon and Kaspi Street Arab families also moved in and no one opened his mouth.

[HA'ARETZ] Do you intend to meet with ministers?

[Me'ir] Apparently, there will be a meeting soon, but we have a problem. We do not believe that this government will hold clean negotiations. There are apparently matters under the table, and I assume that the price of the negotiations is Jerusalem. I do not want them to come and tell us in another year: Look, let us give you some cantons, some neighborhoods in Jerusalem. This is a government whose radical segment is very dangerous, especially the MERETZ people, and there is no lack of Meretz people in Labor. This group is not responsible, and we will do everything to light the fuse here, so that they will not be able to touch Jerusalem.

'Hoopoe' Antiterrorism Unit Described

91AE0641B Tel Aviv YEDIO'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
2 Sep 92 p 30

[Article by Mikhal Goldberg: "First Expose: Hoopoe"]

[Text] Some weeks ago two terrorists crossed the Jordanian border and penetrated the valley with the intent of carrying out a strike. For three days they hung around in Israeli territory, during which time they murdered a kibbutznik from the area. One of the terrorists managed to flee back to Jordan, but his friend remained in the area. Joining in his pursuit was an unknown infantry unit that located the terrorist in one of the trees in the Kibbutz Neve-'Or orange grove. The force fired. The terrorist was eliminated.

The force responsible for eliminating the terrorist belonged to the "hoopoe" unit. That unit was set up nine years ago and worked for an extended period in Lebanon and in the intifadah, but, despite that, has remained anonymous, for good or for bad, as far as the media is concerned. Recently the unit has been drafting new fighters into its ranks, and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] decided to expose it in order that potential draftees and the general public know that "'hoopoe' is not just the name of a bird." The unit, by the way, carries the moniker of the historic "hoopoe" patrol that fought with the Har'el brigade in the Six-Day War, in the battles to liberate Jerusalem; and the name is compelling.

The "hoopoe" unit does its own drafting and training of its fighters, who are now serving in the Jordan valley. It is an infantry muster in every respect, with the unit belonging to an armor formation. The unit is now carrying out regular security, with the aim of frustrating attempts by terrorists to penetrate the settlements. The work is hard, gloomy, and exhausting.

"Our success is not measured in how many terrorists we kill but in how much quiet we achieve" the hoopoes say, "We do not start out to create confrontation in order to count how many were killed and how many wounded. A safe place is a quiet place, even though we could run into something at any time."

Not everyone enjoys moving for hours along the system fence, for months at a time, drilling himself to be ready for a confrontation even when nothing happens, but there are also perks: jeeps, navigating, refresher series at the Wingate Institute and other activities to vary the service. But the unit's commanders try to downplay that.

"It is easy to come to the induction center and start telling the draftees stories of adventures and perks, but afterward there is a yawning gap between what the soldier imagined to himself and what actually happens. We do not want to attract people with cheap ploys," the commander says.

It seems that even so, they do well there. In a conversation with several of the soldiers in the Jordan valley last Tuesday at noon, they sounded satisfied.

Tzahi Qorn from Bat-Yam: "I wanted to be a polished infantry man, but not in just another paratroop or Golani unit, rather in a unit that combined footwork with thinking."

'Avi Tzidon from kibbutz Gvulot: "We are 'poisoned' in the kibbutz. I was clear about going into a fighting unit, but I wanted to make the investment in a special unit so it would earn more feedback."

Shai 'Alfisher of Tel Aviv: "It is true that they really worked our butts off and that we went through elite basic training, but the people here are motivated. It is not a ceramics club or a design-your-own kind of program."

Company commander Captain Qubi: "This track crystallizes them and creates a deep bond between men who would never have met as civilians. When someone has a problem and wants to leave, we try to talk him out of it. We try to help. It is easy to say: 'You cannot hack it, go home,' but when they hear that the alternative is to work in the quartermaster corps, then they generally get scared and stay. In the final analysis, it is the real fighters who stay. How does the song go: 'We are a rare species, a queer bird.'"

Head of Israeli Microsoft Profiled

91AE0641C Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by 'Arye Qizel: "Gates and I are of One Mind"]

[Text] Had you told Yaron Shamir a number of years ago that he would be the head of the Israeli branch of the giant software firm Microsoft, he would undoubtedly have burst out laughing. These days, with a year of activity behind it, the expanding Israeli branch sounds sure of itself, of its future, and of continuing investments in Israel by the giant American firm.

Yaron Shamir (34), married and the father of two daughters, a resident of Zikhron Ya'akov, is one of the Israelis who has made it big. At the age of 22 he was discharged with the rank of captain from his military service in armor and travelled to Haifa, to the Technion. There he completed his studies in computer engineering and, upon graduation, joined Intel. Originally he was a member of the kibbutz Tel-Yosef, but he managed to leave it in the course of his military service.

Go Home, Pack Your Bags

One day, after three and a half years with Intel, his phone rang. "We have heard about you," the voice on the line said in English, "we want you to come for an interview with us at the Microsoft center in Seattle." A week later Shamir presented himself in the offices of the American software firm. Laid out before him was a fat contract for the position of engineer in one of the Microsoft research groups. Go home, they told him, pack your bags, and get back here as quickly as possible.

"I returned to Israel, we got everything taken care of, and left for the United States, I, my wife and our baby daughter," Shamir recalls. "From the first moment the work at Microsoft was an experience. It is a giant firm with an innovative style that affects every one of its employees. Having arrived from Intel, and being familiar with the work ethic of similar firms in Israel, I was excited by the difference.

It is a company whose people do not come to work wearing a tie, a company built entirely around the lone software engineer. Brilliant people from whom you could not make an army because they are talented individualists. They do not wear ties and they are not square. They are all so extraordinary, beginning with the owner of the company, Bill Gates, who started it from scratch at age 20 and today has 10,000 people working for him."

Shamir invested all his energy in his work. Microsoft rewarded him with a big hike in salary after just six months. "One of the nice things there is that Bill Gates, the owner, could take part in a session with junior engineers, listen to them, throw out ideas and set a course, without formality.

Another thing that captivated me—everything is based on the use of personal computers and electronic mail.

The company believes in a personal computer for everyone and proves it in day-to-day work. When I was working on a project in a research group, I could correspond via the computer with every senior, and especially with Bill Gates, and get regular feedback. That method of constantly working with electronic mail allows all kinds of things to get done that cannot be done in other companies.

The company is very centralized. It is run from one place and did not want to expand overseas. I very quickly understood that this is a place that gives every opportunity to develop. You are not tied down by bureaucracy.

An engineer working with a computer who complains that his disk is too small, sends a message on the computer, and the next day is already working with a new disk. You can toss out any idea—and you are right with a senior manager. Everything is without officiousness, without paperwork, without a stifling hierarchy and without a half-year propaganda effort."

Big Plastic Dinosaurs

"The style there is different. The company is based on young people, some of whom come to work barefoot, with a pigtail, with earrings. People sit in dark rooms with computers and listen to music. In other rooms there are models of big plastic dinosaurs. These computer people do not go for ties, but they are young talent whose brains the company needs, asking in return only that they work hard to develop the next generation of software."

In the beginning Yaron joined a development project on one of the operating systems. After nine months he was transferred to the development of new technology in the area of communications. This time, already as manager. A year and a half later he became Microsoft's senior liaison person with Intel.

"After three years, when it came time to go back to Israel, I suggested to the managers that we open a branch in Israel and work there on part of the Windows project. I knew it was a gamble. I knew that Microsoft is very centralized and not interested in developing branches that offer no advantage to the firm."

And, in fact, not everyone was excited. There were managers who vetoed the idea. In the end, Bill Gates made the decision. He sent Shamir 'Avi Natan, another Israeli engineer who worked in Seattle, and dispatched the two of them to Israel to look for a place and interview employees. Shamir rented half a story in the Science Industries Center at the southern approach to Haifa. Along one corridor are located a little more than 10 rooms—a room for each engineer.

In comparison with the crazy head of the young American engineers, the Israelis are square. Wall-to-wall carpets, flower pots with artificial light and just two group rooms—a room for large computers and a room for small

meetings. Nine engineers and a female administrative assistant—that is the entire work force.

The budget for the first year totaled a million dollars. "The administration in Seattle believed in us from the first moment," says Shamir. "Israel has a good reputation in the engineering arena, and they understood that the people here have top-notch brains. They understood that if work goes well on the projects here, profits would far outstrip investment. Our initial problems were the time difference between the United States and Israel and the inability to go into the boss's room, to discuss, to talk, to suggest."

Here Shamir went back to revealing the wonders of electronic mail. He rented a satellite line that connects the Haifa branch with Seattle. Thus they could freely send suggestions, programs or drawings and get feedback from the United States. That does not save him the need to travel five or six times a year to the United States, "and, of course, they want me to come more often."

They Get in Whenever They Want

So what exactly do those young Technion graduates do? They are working on two projects: a Windows subsystem and development of a system that allows Windows applications to run on the well-known DOS. The third project is already on the way. Incidentally, the Israeli success has already pointed the way for others: Microsoft recently opened a branch in London.

Shamir is optimistic. Success has been good to him. Bill Gates, for example, has already authorized him a 50-percent increase next year in the number of employees. Meanwhile he has already managed to take all his Israeli employees on a pleasure trip to the United States, where they visited the Microsoft center, went rafting, enjoyed themselves, and got raises.

"At Microsoft," he says, "there is a lot of money and a lot of work. People are happy here because they work hard and are well paid. There is no punch card system here. Everyone comes and goes when he wants to. We measure the output once every six months, and then they raise salaries if there is a need to. There are bonuses here, stock participation, and potential. I am happy that Microsoft gambled well and made a wise decision."

Frenkel's First Year at Bank of Israel Assessed

92AE0605C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Aug 92
p B1

[Article, including interview with Ya'aqov Frenkel, by Judy Meletz; place and date not given]

[Text] Several hours before taking over as governor of the Bank of Israel on 15 August 1991, Ya'aqov Frenkel was greeted by a July [inflation] rate [increase] of 3 percent, which "was a surprise blow to the economy." Now, a year later, there is talk of single-digit inflation in Israel.

On that same hot day in August when Frenkel was installed as governor at a ceremony at the president's residence, the details of Israel's request to the U.S. administration for loan guarantees began to take shape. One week ago, Frenkel returned from a visit to Washington, where he and Prime Minister Rabin received the good news about the U.S. administration's approval of Israel's request.

These major gains—a drop in inflation and approval of the guarantees—cannot of course be attributed to Frenkel alone. However, he no doubt had a part in both achievements.

The political turnaround [represented by Labor Alignment's electoral victory] was certainly the determining factor in obtaining approval for the loan guarantees. However, Frenkel accompanied the process and coordinated the handling of the economic issues related to the request from the outset.

A year ago, a significant number of public figures opposed the appointment of Frenkel, former chief economist at the IMF, as governor of the Bank of Israel. With all due respect for Frenkel's international reputation and his close relations with finance ministers and central bank governors throughout the world, Frenkel's opponents said that he abandoned Israel 18 years ago for an international career, and that he does not understand the dynamic of the political-economic establishment in Israel and its key figures.

However, his opponents were quickly proven wrong. Not only did he reassimilate into Israel quickly and easily, but, within several months, he emerged as one of the strongest figures in Israel's political-economic establishment.

Someone who does not especially admire him defines him as a great manipulator and a "pusher." Others view him as a first-rate statesman and diplomat. What is clear to everyone is that the man with the innocent appearance and winning smile knows exactly how to get what he wants.

Despite the resolute opposition of senior Finance Ministry officials and even members of the directorate of the Bank of Israel, Frenkel succeeded, four months after becoming governor, in changing the exchange rate policy that had been in effect in Israel for many years. Those who were then skeptical are now willing to acknowledge that the "diagonal line" [i.e., crawling peg] method has proven itself as a tool for increasing the profitability of exports, lowering inflation, and preventing speculative waves of foreign currency acquisitions.

Almost the only criticism heard today is that Frenkel acted too late. In other words, had he managed to introduce the change one or two months earlier, he would have prevented a wave of foreign currency speculation, which resulted in a steep drop in foreign currency reserves and a sharp increase in interest rates in late 1991.

Frenkel also proved himself capable of contending with the banks. Ever since early 1992, when he unequivocally warned that he intended to take administrative measures to reduce interest if the banks did not reduce it themselves, debitory interest, as well as the financial ratios [mirvahim] of the banks, have been declining. Frenkel was also very insistent that only he and his people manage and direct monetary policy.

In addition to these achievements, Frenkel managed in his first months as governor to introduce far-reaching reform in the foreign exchange area. As a result, Israeli citizens can now open foreign currency accounts in banks in Israel and invest in foreign securities. Frenkel has also exercised a considerable influence on budgetary policy, mainly through a law which he initiated for determining the budget deficit reduction path.

To achieve his goals, Frenkel exploited, at least until a month ago, a vacuum which had developed in the Finance Ministry. In the traditional policy debates between the Finance Ministry and the central bank, Frenkel no doubt derived an advantage from the fact that former Finance Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i was not backed by the government, and his director-general, Shalom Zinger, was not esteemed within the establishment.

This situation enabled Frenkel to gain control of exchange rate policy, an area which previously had been the joint purview of the Finance Ministry and the central bank. It also enabled him to become the leader in contacts with the Americans regarding the guarantees. By neutralizing the Finance Ministry, Frenkel greatly strengthened the central bank's position over the past year.

Frenkel is no doubt riding a wave of international sympathy. In the past two weeks, very commending [mefarganot] reports have been published about him in several of the most prestigious newspapers in the world, including THE FINANCIAL TIMES of England, and BUSINESS WEEK and THE WASHINGTON POST of the United States.

In all of these reports, Frenkel is described as supposedly spearheading a far-reaching plan for economic reforms in Israel's economy.

Those who viewed the [former] American professor with a touch of cynicism a year ago now acknowledge that Frenkel has done what his predecessors and leaders of academia in Israel had failed to do, which is to introduce the consciousness and standards of the "big world" in Israel.

On his first day on the job, Frenkel decided that his first war would be against inflation (not against unemployment, which many viewed as a more pressing problem). He did so because he knows that potential foreign investors and international banks are most interested in a state's inflation level, not its unemployment rate.

The governor wastes no opportunity to stress the importance with which the West views privatization.

The "Quiet Strength" Factor

It was once thought that Frenkel's many international commitments—he is a member of the steering committee of the G7 countries, a member in the G30 (a group comprising 30 international banking leaders and financial experts), a permanent participant in the Forum of Leaders of the International Economy, and a member in the BIS [expansion not given] (the umbrella organization for central banks in the world)—would not allow him sufficient time to handle the problems of the Israeli economy.

However, Frenkel has proven that he can use his time in Israel most effectively, and he works long overtime hours. If you ask him what his greatest achievements were this year, he will certainly point to the G30's decision to hold its semiannual meeting in Jerusalem two months ago.

Frenkel's style is completely different from that of his predecessor, Professor Mikha'el Bruno. Bruno preferred to maintain a certain distance from politicians and governmental officials. By contrast, Frenkel, who is well aware of the significance of a political lobby, is friendly with everyone.

Bruno was not afraid of clashing head-on with members of the political echelon. He did not hesitate to express controversial opinions publicly, whether regarding the need to cancel the Lavi [fighter aircraft] project or his opposition to the sale of Bank Discount to the Recanati family.

Frenkel, by contrast, prefers to act and persuade behind the scenes. He also refrains as much as possible from taking unequivocal positions on sensitive questions. In the deliberations over the budget this year and last year, Frenkel insisted on the need for cuts, but refused to state explicitly that the defense budget should be cut.

It is not yet clear whether the new government will be as captivated with Frenkel's charm as the previous government was. However, a certain change has already reportedly occurred in the balance of power between the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel, the two leading economic policy forces in Israel. This change is likely to make things a bit difficult for the Bank of Israel.

This change stems from the appointment of a new finance minister (Avraham Shohat) with broad backing in the government, and the appointment of a strong Finance Ministry director-general, who, in the past, was one of the strongest critics of the Bank of Israel. However, the first real test of wills between the central bank and the Finance Minister is still several months away, when leaders of the economic establishment will have to decide on the coming year's exchange rate policy.

[Meletz] Professor Frenkel, in retrospect, what was your most difficult moment this year?

[Frenkel] I would say that I had two such moments. I would not call them difficult, but memorable. One was on the night of 16 December, when it was decided to change the exchange rate policy. I knew exactly what should not be done, what needed to be done, and what had been done. Therefore, in this sense, I was very much at peace with myself.

That was a very tense night because it was important that we arrive at [a decision on] this matter together. There were several discussions and debates. But after several good hours, we reached an agreement. As a result, the economy is reaping the benefits to this day.

A second, very difficult time, was the night I met with banking leaders. In the end, a significant reduction in interest rates was agreed upon. I am very satisfied that we arrived at all of this without actually using the administrative authorities granted to the governor.

We were not forced to issue orders or circulars. Nonetheless, this was not a comfortable experience for one who believes that policy's role is to create favorable conditions for a competitive system to operate independently without excessive direction. In this case, it was clear that the economy's welfare required these measures.

[Meletz] A year ago, you said that accepting the governorship would be a great challenge. A year later, do you believe that the State of Israel is perhaps "too small for you"?

[Frenkel] Certainly not. The dimensions of the challenge are still as I had envisioned them. It is not possible to fully digest what is happening in these times. Our children will look back on this period of immigration absorption as a critical point in the Jewish people's history.

[Meletz] Would you agree to the appraisal that the situation that prevailed until a month ago, in which you worked against a weak finance minister, was to your advantage?

[Frenkel] First, I want to rectify several things in the question. Regarding the expression I worked 'against' a finance minister, in my installation speech, I insisted on close cooperation between the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel as a matter of great importance. No system in the world has succeeded economically without cooperation of this type. Therefore, I want to stress that I have not worked 'against' the finance minister, but 'together with him.'

Second, you said that the finance minister was weak. I want to commend [lefargen] Yitzhaq Moda'i. I think that he is a good finance minister, and I do not think that he was a weak finance minister. Perhaps he did not have the government's full backing. But this teaches us something

else, namely the great importance of full governmental backing for the finance minister.

I would hope that the backing which the Bank of Israel has received in its differences of opinion with the Finance Ministry reflects the fact that the Bank of Israel's positions were convincing. Therefore, I want to believe that the Bank of Israel is treated as an independent, professional factor which has no political interest.

[Meletz] You spoke earlier of the new exchange rate policy being a major achievement. How would you respond if, in several months, the finance minister and his director-general decided to change the system?

[Frenkel] I am convinced—based on what I know, and I am not guessing—that such an occurrence is simply impossible. Everyone knows that a one-time nominal change in the exchange rate solely for the sake of change would undermine our stability. It is very easy and therefore very enticing to change the exchange rate. But just as there is no free lunch in life, there is no free lunch in economic policy.

[Meletz] Last year, you almost single-handedly conducted the contacts with the Americans regarding the guarantees. Why did you choose not to include a senior Finance Ministry official in the contacts?

[Frenkel] Throughout the entire process, and before each trip [to the United States], there was full coordination between me and the senior Finance Ministry team, including the director-general of the Finance Ministry of course. Before each trip, I was supportive of a high-level official from the Finance Ministry joining me. But the decision was in the finance minister's hands. The Finance Ministry participated effectively in all of the contacts between the parties through Amnon Neubach, the economic envoy in Washington.

[Meletz] What position would you like to hold next?

[Frenkel] I do not wish to address this question. Anyone holding a position who thinks about his next position and does not invest all of his thoughts in his current position has very high chances of failure.

Inflation-Unemployment Ratio in Economy Examined

92AE0605A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Aug 92
p B1

[Article by Avraham Tal]

[Text] Which industrialized country has the lowest inflation rate in the world? That happy country is New Zealand, whose annual inflation rate of 0.8 percent is an outstanding achievement for the very conservative government of Jim Bolger. Is this a source of great happiness for New Zealand? Yes, but if the residents of New Zealand are asked, it is doubtful whether they would unanimously agree to being called a "happy country." At

least 11 percent of them would have reservations, to wit the 11 percent who are unemployed.

Experience points to a negative ratio between inflation and unemployment. In other words, rising unemployment is a function of falling inflation. Countries that have managed to reduce inflation have usually done so at the expense of an increase in unemployment. There are rare exceptions of countries that have managed to have it both ways (e.g., Japan, with 2 percent unemployment and inflation of about 2.5 percent; and the Netherlands with 4 percent unemployment and 3 percent inflation). In most industrialized countries, however, a negative ratio prevails. This is the case also in Israel. In the mid-sixties, inflation was particularly low, and unemployment reached alarming rates. In the galloping inflation of the seventies and eighties, Israel enjoyed virtually full employment.

Many articles and books have been written to explain the relation between inflation and employment, especially to identify factors that curb inflation without increasing unemployment, or increase employment without causing inflation. Apparently, economists have yet to formulate suitable remedies, or in any case, useful remedies to which politicians will agree. The negative ratio continues to exist.

In recent months, the Israeli economy has seen a rapid drop in inflation, much to the surprise of decisionmakers and economists. (The former finance minister, Yitzhaq Moda'i, indeed takes credit for the drop, although he may as well take credit for the rainy winter). In early 1992, "realists" estimated that inflation in 1992 would be 18 percent, while optimists estimated that it would be 14 to 15 percent. However, the July index points to an apparently unexpected prize, namely single-digit inflation in 1992.

And what about unemployment? After reaching a peak of 11.6 percent of the total labor force in the first quarter, a slight drop to 10.8 percent was recorded in the second quarter. However, this change is not significant enough to represent a trend for statistical and other reasons. Moreover, in the first month of the third quarter, July, a 10-percent increase was recorded in job seekers at the [employment] agencies (5 percent when a seasonal adjustment is made) compared to June. According to this, the pressure on the labor market is growing again.

The new government is still somewhat confused regarding its order of economic priorities. It is attempting to find its way while preparing the 1993 budget. However, the Bank of Israel [the central bank] has already decided to set the national priorities. Its first priority is to lower inflation to "a European level [to attract foreign investors]." Its thinking in this regard is that continued unemployment at a European level for another one to three years would not be so terrible.

The Bank of Israel Law outlines two goals which, according to the preceding paragraph, do not always agree with each other. On the one hand, the bank is

required to act to "stabilize the value of the currency in Israel and abroad." On the other hand, it is required to effect "a high level of job creation, national income, and capital investments in Israel." The bank's current governor, Ya'akov Frenkel, perhaps inspired by the school which molded him (the University of Chicago) and his former place of employment (the IMF), believes that achieving the first goal (stabilizing the shekel) is a prerequisite for progress in achieving the second goal. Therefore, he is focusing the bulk of his efforts on fighting inflation.

His predecessor, Mikha'el Bruno, also deemed stabilization the main policy goal. However, when he realized in 1988 (a bit too late) that a primary policy tool, the exchange rate anchor, was liable to mire the economy in a recession, he moved quickly to liberate the exchange rate. Since then, the anchor has been reestablished, and the economy is trudging along.

Now, since having come very close to single-digit inflation, the time has come to switch emphases. Curbing inflation must become a secondary priority in favor of increasing growth, investments, production, export, and employment. In practical terms, this means, among other things: an adjustment of the shekel rate to its real value compared to foreign currencies; the creation of a deficit in the budget (beyond that outlined in the law) to finance infrastructure works, research and development, and other expenditures that do not enlarge the government apparatus; energetic action to reduce interest rates further; and a reduction of the tax burden on businesses and low and middle income earners.

For the good of the economy, especially the 170,000 to 180,000 unemployed persons, 15 percent inflation and 5 percent unemployment is preferable to 5 percent inflation and 15 percent unemployment. To the attention of Yitzhaq Rabin: This too is a "change in the order of priorities."

Budget Problems of Qol Yisra'el External Service

92AE0591E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
13 Aug 92 p 35

[Article by O.'Arif: "Israel Without a Voice" [or: "Yisra'el Without a Qol"]]

[Text] Shortly, the Jews of the Diaspora are liable to return to the days of Hava Nagila, instead of listening to current Israeli news and music which flow directly from the studio in Jerusalem to the household radio of the listener in Europe, Yemen, or America.

Just now, contact is being made with Education Minister Shulamit Aloni, with the goal of finding financing for the Qol Yisra'el broadcasts abroad. If funding is not found, the broadcasting authority threatens to stop the broadcasts. "We will not pay Bezeq for the transmitters," clarified a member of the administrative committee of the broadcasting authority Yehuda Bruce, who is also the head of the Yavne council.

Bruce does not agree that an old woman from Yavne, for example, should have to finance the propaganda services of the state of Israel abroad. And this is what is essentially happening now: The broadcasting authority is financing the broadcasts with money received from government fees.

The cessation of Israeli broadcasts on short waves is liable to result in other countries snatching up the frequencies. It is not impossible that Arab countries, or even hostile elements will use them for the propaganda purposes that plague Israel so much. When the broadcasts abroad were reduced in the evening hours last summer, Syria and the organization of Ahmed Jibril seized the frequencies.

Not long ago, the U.S. ambassador in Israel, William Harrop, said in a meeting with newspaper editors, that he always uses the broadcasts from Israel to get the correct interpretation of that which is occurring in the Middle East. Like Harrop, other diplomats and citizens throughout the world are also in the habit of listening to the broadcasts of Qol Yisra'el on short waves.

The German, Yojin Parta, owner of a renowned survey institute, revealed in a survey conducted by him that the broadcasts of Qol Yisra'el, in 1991, were in second place from the aspect of the listening rate, immediately behind Radio Free Europe. The BBC hobbled in third after Qol Yisra'el, while the Voice of America came in only in fourth place.

Now, the danger of closing down the broadcast abroad is hovering, since the broadcasting authority "made a muscle" and unambiguously declared that it is not prepared to finance the heavy expense of the broadcasts abroad out of its own pockets.

The significant of this step is far-reaching. First and foremost, from the aspect of the abandonment of Israeli propaganda in the world. Second, it is impossible to ignore the look of pain among the Jewish listening public in the Diaspora. On a local plane, others will be hurt—111 radio employees: reporters, editors, and broadcasters in 14 languages, and 90 employees of the Bezeq company, who deal with short-wave broadcasts.

Broadcasting over short waves costs the broadcasting authority \$8 million per year. We are speaking of the most expensive equipment—high-powered transmitters, each one of which costs \$5 million. The transmitters belong to the communications bureau, but they are loaned to the Bezeq company, which operates them.

The agitation is also felt in Bezeq. Paliq Markovitzki, chairman of the communications workers committee in the company, throws a glove to Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres: "At the end of the '60's, Shim'on Peres was the communications minister, and he made a great effort to advance the broadcasts abroad. Today he is on the other side—on the side that has to pay."

Markovitzki was concerned about the future of the workers: "We are living in uncertainty in connection to that which is happening. All of our neighbors are increasing their short-wave broadcasts. Finland has 60 languages for broadcasts abroad. We are a country that cannot permit itself not to broadcast. The government must make a policy decision, once and for all, that it wants the broadcasts and is financing them."

Shmu'el Ben-Tzvi, manager of the section for broadcasting abroad: "We have super-professional people, with experience, but the feeling is with us all the time that we are not wanted. A year ago, they closed down the nighttime broadcasts. We are afraid of further damage."

What is broadcast abroad on short wave? Currently, the broadcasts consist of a variegated mosaic of practical and news broadcasts, as well as broadcasts on the history of the land of Israel, a little Zionism, holidays, and Jewish heritage, broadcasts on culture and art, as well as a high dose of Israeli music.

The section for broadcasts abroad is swamped with letters. Approximately 600 letters per month reach the English and French departments, and some 250 letters to the Russian department. The section also maintains a steady correspondence with roughly 6,000 listeners throughout the world. Aside from Russian, English, French, and Spanish, there are also programs in Georgian, Bukharic, Ladino, Yiddish, Mogravian, Rumanian, Hungarian, Yemenite, Tatarian (Caucasia), and easy Hebrew.

The director of the broadcasting authority, Ariye Maqel, explains: "Approximately four years ago, the Foreign Ministry and the Jewish Agency stopped financing the broadcasts, and then we found ourselves in the situation where we must finance the whole deal.

"It was up to us to go in reverse, for today, few bend an ear to a short-wave radio. Stations such as Voice of America and Liberated British Radio have changed over to satellites. Technically, the whole world has moved forward, and with the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the contents are also changing. But, a strange situation has been created, where no one is prepared to finance the broadcasts.

"We are prepared to continue to finance the cost of the employees and the studios, but I do not think that it is the job of the one paying government fees to finance Bezeq. They are rich enough even without us. If the state of Israel wants propaganda services, the state of Israel must pay."

Nevertheless, Maqel promises that a solution will be found and that the broadcasts will not cease. They now pin the hope on the minister of education. The minister of communications, Mikha'el Rafa'eli, advises: "The minister is examining a number of options, including the option of a "loaded" satellite. The broadcasting authority cannot stop these broadcasts, because it operates according to the law."

Funding of Development Towns, Settlements Debated

92AE0605D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 21 Aug 92 p 25

[Article by Yitzhaq Bar-Yosef]

[Text] "The development towns receive much more than the settlements of Judaea and Samaria," claims the head of the Alfey Menashe council, Shlomo Qatan, in responding to longstanding claims that preference is given to the settlements of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza over settlements inside the green line [i.e., the 1967 border]. Two hundred families are in the process of moving to Alfey Menashe, and 650 families already live there as the new school year approaches.

When they signed [housing] contracts a year ago, those now moving to Alfey Menashe were acting on a decision to move across the green line, whose color faded during the Likud's tenure. This week, when it seems that the old border line is regaining its color following Prime Minister Rabin's assurances to the U.S. administration [to reduce settlement activity], Qatan is trying to remain optimistic. Only last Saturday, he says, three families signed contracts to purchase units in Alfey Menashe's new villa neighborhood.

However, Qatan is not complacent. He has decided to fire back at the growing offensive against the settlements of Judaea and Samaria, and against the claims that, under Likud rule, he and his friends in Elqana, Ari'el, and the rest of the 145 settlements on the other side of the green line enjoyed disproportionate bonuses and generous state investments that were much larger than those made in development towns inside the green line.

Ironically, Yitzhaq Shamir's picture as prime minister still hangs in his office. Qatan indeed acknowledges, "I telephoned to request Rabin's photograph immediately after the elections, but was told by the information center that there were still no pictures. Only now have they informed us that there are pictures." Incidentally, Shamir's picture was distributed free of charge, but a picture of Rabin costs three shekels. Near the settlement's entrance, one can already see how the situation has changed under Labor. Dozens of levelled dunams stand empty and desolate. Only a flock of goats watched by an Arab shepherd roams there. The site was supposed to be Alfey Menashe's new industrial park, where investors had planned to build factories that were to employ about 200 persons. But the building freeze put a halt to everything.

Qatan: "I never used to care about the hostile reports on the bonuses, as it were, which we receive. After each report on television, I always told the members of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council that hundreds of families interested in buying a house on such good terms are streaming to us. Even after finding out that it is not

so, some still buy and settle down with us." However, recently, Qatan lost his patience and went on the counterattack.

Qatan presents a table showing the 1990 budget allocations for development towns compared to those for the local authorities in Judaea and Samaria. The table shows that per capita expenditure for the local authorities in Judaea and Samaria is usually between 20 to 40 percent lower than for the local authorities in the development towns. He adds that a local authority in Judaea and Samaria incurs many costs unknown to a local authority inside the green line, i.e., for security, transportation, and the maintenance of an ambulance and driver of Magen David Adom [Israel's emergency medical services equivalent of the Red Cross], which does not operate on the other side of the green line. In addition, Qatan claims, the settlements in Judaea and Samaria receive no aid from the Jewish Agency, the Joint [Distribution Committee], Project Neighborhood Renewal, and other financing sources for the maintenance of public libraries and youth culture and sport centers.

Qatan also objects to the nouveau riche image which has been applied to residents of Judaea and Samaria. He cites himself as an example. In 1982, he was a lieutenant colonel in army intelligence. He joined a settlement project in Samaria that was being organized by career army personnel. He sold his three-room apartment in Ramat Aviv Gimel for \$60,000 and bought a six-room cottage for \$80,000 in Alfey Menashe. He maintains that he could have bought a similar cottage in that same period in many places between Hadera and Gadera, but he preferred Alfey Menashe, which is near the center of the country.

He received a \$3,000 grant and a linked loan of \$17,000, which he now repays in monthly installments of 900 shekels and will continue to do so for another 10 years. His situation is similar to that of most of Alfey Menashe's residents, who pay between 900 and 1,500 shekels per month for the loans which they have taken out. In other words, he says, "from an economic standpoint, I was not enormously lucky. Today, I could sell the apartment I owned in Ramat-Aviv for much more than my house here is worth."

He also rebels against the myth of free land being distributed in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Until a year and a half ago, he says, a half dunam cost \$2,000. Only now have the [utilities] hook-up fees been eliminated. However, unlike development towns, residents in Judaea and Samaria are required to bear the costs of development, electricity, water, and sewage, which reach \$35,000 per plot, according to Qatan. Today, a villa in Alfey Menashe costs between \$180,000 and \$200,000. Thus, Qatan says, one cannot speak of villas being distributed here at bargain prices.

He also rejects claims that [Jewish] residents in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza receive disproportionate discounts and exemptions. Contrary to what has been reported, he

says, Alfey Menashe residents pay a 4.5 percent purchase tax, which is also the case in most of the settlements of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. There is indeed a 7 percent income tax reduction, but residents of other development settlements are also entitled to it.

Even my father-in-law, a member of [the leftist] MAPAI [Israel Workers Party] from Kibbutz 'Evron, understands this [desire to move to a new settlement per se]. People stream to a young settlement because they can have an impact on its destiny. The same thing is happening in the Galilee and the Negev. However, the Galilee and the Negev are far from the country's center. We, on the other hand, are close to Tel Aviv, and we offer a good quality of life that does not entail moving far away from places of employment, social life, and relatives in Tel Aviv.

Qatan acknowledges that a decision to move to the territories, which one could base solely on quality of life considerations 10 years ago, now involves some soul-searching because a segment of the public opposes settlement in the territories. The freeze will also have an effect from now on. In Alfey Menashe, more than 100 housing units have been frozen. Some people have invested tens of thousands of dollars in "Build Your Own Home" construction now stuck in a pre-completion stage.

Palestinians Seek West Bank Antiquities Control

92AE0605B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Aug 92
p B7

[Article by Yosi Torpstein]

[Text] For legal political reasons, Palestinian archaeologists do not conduct archeological excavations in the territories. They claim that international law forbids the excavation of antiquities in an occupied area. Because the Israeli administration is conducting many excavations in the territories, the Palestinians have no interest in providing the administration with any justification for its actions. They have therefore adopted the principle of not applying for excavation permits. Their refrainment from doing so is also reinforced by their view that they would not receive a positive response even if they were to request permits.

Nonetheless, many Palestinians have been conducting excavations in the territories for years. Most of them are villagers who remove antiquities from the recesses of the ground and sell them through networks of Palestinian and Israeli middlemen and antiquities dealers. Their activity amounts to the large-scale theft of antiquities. Many Palestinian antiquities robbers demonstrate impressive practical knowledge in locating and identifying antiquities. However, their unsystematic excavations are causing great irreparable damage to archeological sites and research. Archaeologists maintain that the removal of artifacts from their in situ locations in the layers of ground means, in many cases, the loss of the ability to scientifically reconstruct a site's history. This

phenomenon exists despite the spirit of archaeologist Nazmi Ja'abah, a member of one of the Palestinian team involved in the peace process and a lecturer at Bi'r Zayt University. Like most Israeli archaeologists, Ja'abah opposes the disturbance of archeological sites. He is currently engaged in planning the future character of Palestinian archaeology as a member of one of the professional teams created this year as part of Palestinian preparations for negotiations with Israel.

Nazmi Ja'abah presented his doctoral dissertation in archaeology in Germany. His dissertation deals with Hebron in the transition period between Byzantine rule and Arab rule. He even specialized in biblical archaeology and learned Hebrew. He is willing to cooperate with the Antiquities Authority. He states, "If the Israelis convey information to me regarding a certain place where the theft of antiquities is occurring, I am willing to go there immediately to convince the Palestinian antiquities robbers to stop and to explain to them the great damage which they are causing to research dealing with their own people's history. However, I am of course not willing to serve as a policeman or informer. Enforcing the law is the authorities' responsibility. Ultimately, the Israelis must protect our antiquities. In time, they must provide us with all of the finds which they uncovered in their illegal excavations in the territories, and not hide them in Israeli museums. We will demand this in the negotiations."

The Israeli Antiquities Authority has taken an interest in Nazmi Ja'abah's remarks. Archaeologist, 'Uzi Dehari, the head of the Antiquities Theft Prevention Unit, views such coordination with the Palestinians as positive and desirable. He adds that, contrary to Nazmi Ja'abah's impression, the antiquities uncovered in the territories receive a special marking, the intention being to transfer them to the authority to be established in the territories. However, doubt exists in Israeli archaeology circles as to whether the Israeli administration workers really intend to systematically transfer all of the antiquities found in the territories to the Palestinians in the future. No one in the civilian administration agreed to comment on the matter.

Nazmi Ja'abah states, "Awareness of the importance of antiquities is still limited. We must enhance this awareness, because these antiquities are part of our historical legacy. Students and the public must become familiar with this legacy. In addition, antiquities are a national asset that can be developed as a revenue source in the future."

The Palestinian professional team in which Ja'abah is a member, which exists alongside the delegation to the peace process, is currently engaged in two primary tasks: planning the creation of a Palestinian antiquities authority, and creating a database. Members of the team are surveying the need for archaeological specialists, e.g., to preserve sites and operate museums. They intend to train such specialists. In the next three months, they will send people abroad to specialize in the needed areas.

Palestinian archaeologists are also involved in mapping archeological sites in the territories, surveying sites which have been excavated by Israelis, and registering antiquities taken from these sites.

There are relatively many centers in the territories containing exhibits of the material Palestinian legacy, mainly from the last 200 years. However, there are no archaeological museums, except for the Islam Museum on the Temple Mount, which was established in 1923 by the Supreme Muslim Council. The Rockefeller Museum, established in 1929 by the British mandate authorities and considered a serious archaeological museum, is viewed by the Palestinians as a Palestinian institution. The Palestinians will seek to gain control of it in the negotiations with Israel.

Nazmi Ja'abah grumbles, "Palestinian archaeology is still in its infancy despite some recent progress." At Bi'r Zayt University, 15 students are currently studying at the Archaeology Institute. At al-Najah University in Nabulus, 25 students are studying archaeology. The other universities do not have archaeology departments. In the territories, there are about 80 holders of academic degrees in archaeology. Only a few are employed in their fields or in closely related fields, such as the teaching of history. The archaeologists in the territories do not have a professional journal for the publication of their research, perhaps because there are no scientific excavations carried out by Palestinians.

It is difficult for Palestinian archaeologists and students to accumulate practical experience in excavating antiquities. Without such experience, they cannot become well-rounded archaeologists. Palestinian students have participated in a few excavations since 1967. Since 1978, excavations have been conducted at Tel Janin during several seasons. In the mid-eighties, there was digging at Tel Ta'anakh. All of these digs were headed by Professor Albert Ernst Glock [an American archeologist], who obtained excavation permits from the civil administration. However, as a rule, foreign archaeologists do not dig in the territories due to the political implications.

Glock, who was murdered in January 1992 at Bi'r Zayt in mysterious circumstances that have yet to be solved, headed the archaeology department at Bi'r Zayt. He dealt mainly in researching the socioeconomic aspects of the Palestinians' lives during Ottoman rule in the land in the 16th and 17th centuries. Glock sought to reflect the character of material Palestinian culture and highlight its impact on the history of the land. Archaeology indirectly touches a sensitive nerve in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over "the right to the land." The Palestinian search for national historical depth has compelled Palestinian researchers and politicians to create virtually impossible indirect links with peoples who lived in the land before it was occupied by the Hebrews, and to deny or disregard the prominent Jewish presence in the history of the land. According to this concept, the Canaanites, Jebusites, Edomites, and Nabateans were Arab tribes. According to

Nazmi Ja'abah, Herod, the king of Judea [from 37-4 BCE], for example, was actually an Arab Edomite."

An article published early this month in the PLO's organ, FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH, claims that "not one Jewish stone has been found" in Silwan, which is the area adjacent to the Temple Mount which the Israelis call the City of David. FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH claims that Israeli archaeologists who excavated there found only remnants of Arab structures and palaces from the period of the Umayyad caliphs dating to the 7th and 8th centuries. It adds that Canaanite and Hellenistic, but not Jewish, remains were found in previous excavations. Such claims do not tally with what was uncovered at the site. 'Uzi Dehari of the Antiquities Authority stated that many remains from the Iron Age, which is the period of the First Temple, were found in the excavations. In the Second Temple period, he adds, the area was made into a Jewish burial ground.

However, Palestinian archaeologists are now generally adopting more scientific approaches. The central concept of their archaeological world view is that the residents of the land are the direct continuation and result of all of the cultures which have existed in the land, including the Canaanite, Jewish, Islamic, and other cultures. Hence, the Palestinians' connection to the land is unshakable.

'Ali Ziyadah, who graduated in architecture and archaeology from al-Yarmuk University in Jordan says, "From a scientific standpoint, we are interested in all periods. Our roots, as inhabitants of the land living on our soil from time immemorial, begin in the earliest periods of the history of the land. Regardless of whether the Canaanites were originally Arabs or spoke Arabic, they are a part of my historical and cultural roots, as is the Jewish culture which existed in certain periods in the land. It would be incorrect to highlight the history of a single people among the many peoples who invaded Palestine and settled in it. The matter should be seen from the viewpoint of the entire history of the land."

Most Palestinian researchers tend to deal with the Islamic period. They claim that the Islamic period has been deliberately neglected by Israeli and foreign researchers, who have focused their attention mainly on "biblical archaeology" to prove Jewish domination of the history of the land. Nazmi Ja'abah is currently doing a study of Ottoman construction in Jerusalem in the 16th and 17th centuries. 'Ali Ziyadah, a lecturer at Bi'r Zayt in architecture, deals in his studies primarily with the early Islamic period. He has also written studies on Beyt She'an and Tiberias.

"One should be careful about using history and archaeology to prove modern political claims" Nazmi Ja'abah concludes, directing his remarks to Israeli politicians and researchers, who, in his perception, are embodied in the characters of Moshe Dayan [an archeology enthusiast] and Yig'al Yadin [the late Israeli archeologist]. "Such use supports erroneous logic according to which I should

return to Spain, because Arabs once held political power there, even though people of other nations have since lived there as well. One must always keep in view the broad cultural circle and the other side of the coin."

Description of Negev Technology Park, Projects

92AE0585C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
4 Aug 92 p 5

[Article by Dana Peretz: "Under the Auspices of the Dimona Reactor"]

[Text] Dr. Peter Wachmin, an expert on lasers, beams with joy. He has just achieved a breakthrough in his project. He has succeeded in generating a two-dimensional picture with his laser cannon. The final objective of the project is to build a three-dimensional laser microscope. As far as is known—and if no one somewhere else on the face of the planet beats Dr. Wachmin—this will be "a projecting laser microscope, which produces a three-dimensional picture," the first of its kind in the world.

In another room, sitting in front of the computer, is computer scientist Dr. Munya Gendelman. Alongside him is Prof. Yitzhaq Dinstein of Ben Gurion University, who is advising him on the subject of image-processing and the identification of forms. What they are doing, in simple terms, is an attempt to teach the computer to identify characters and numbers on paper. Computers that read letters printed on paper have already existed for some time. The innovation here is that a computer is being built that can read and understand additional symbols.

At the end of the corridor, behind a plywood divider, crowded uncomfortably, sit a father and son, Dr. Shmu'el Katz and Dr. Michael Katz, the first, an expert in chemistry, and the second, in physics. They are applying unique knowledge, which they brought from Russia, in the field of special ceramics that can withstand great heat. What they are now developing will be the future construction material of products related to extremely high heat. For example, jet engines.

It is a bit difficult to interview the two, as the father, aged 70, wants to speak precisely about Dimona, which he regards as the most boring city in the world, while the son, 36, wants to talk about their work, which, he seems to think, is the most interesting thing in the world.

Dr. Wachmin, Dr. Gendelman, and the Drs. Katz are four of the 90 new immigrants—scientists, engineers, and technicians—who were absorbed in the MATA (Future Technologies Center) technology incubator in the TAMAD (Negev Science Industries) industrial park that is next to the KAMAG (Nuclear Research Kirya) in Dimona.

The incubator was established, relates Director-General Aryeh Sharon, less than two years ago and was the first of its type in the country, perhaps in the world. Today,

according to him, there are already 25 such incubators in the country, where approximately 500 projects are being sprouted by 2,500 scientists and engineers. The Israeli model of a technological incubator, according to the staff, is unique and unprecedented.

Eli Levi, the director of business development of TAMAD: "As far as we know, there is no similar model, because this is an integration of the intention of the state to absorb immigration with technological research and development projects, with a large portion being financed by the government." Director-General Aryeh Sharon: "The Israeli technology incubator is, in my opinion, very, very special due to the character of the goals that it is meant to serve and due to the risk that the government was willing to take. This is the only true venture capital that exists in the market, in my opinion."

But we went south as far as Dimona not only for the incubator. The incubator is only one park, and we will return to it below, in the main story, which is the TAMAD industrial park next to the KAMAG. By chance, we happened on an historic day, which moved several of the local people. Not only Dr. Wachmin, who produced a first two-dimensional image on the way to three-dimensionality, celebrated that day. Gid'on Shavit, the manager of TAMAD and the director-general of "Rotem" also was emotional. It was his last day in both of these positions. And parting is always difficult.

A few words about "Rotem Industries." This is a government company, which was established 10 years ago in order to bridge between the KAMAG's ideas and scientific developments and those who could implement them. The first building was erected in TAMAD six years ago on an area of 6,400 square meters, and it houses the enterprises that were established for that purpose.

But it is not only developments of KAMAG that are implemented there. Private entrepreneurs, as well, on the condition that they are in the areas of advanced industry, are welcomed. "Rotem" aids the private entrepreneur to overcome the bureaucracy that is involved in establishing an enterprise or in moving it to TAMAD. It provides him with infrastructure for business development, accompanies him on his first steps and facilitates his absorption there. In recent years, there has been an annual increase of 25-30 percent in the activities of "Rotem," Shavit reports. Last year, its sales came to \$3 million, of which \$1 million were exports, and profits were \$300,000. According to him, "Rotem" has penetrated the markets of Japan and of the United States. In Japan, for example, it competes in the market for instruments for detecting radiation.

"The uniqueness of TAMAD," says Shavit, "is the connection between commercialization and industrial development by a scientific center such as KAMAG with a deployment of private entrepreneurs. The advantage is that private initiative brings the atmosphere of the proper development of businesses. The interaction

between private initiative and the activity of a government company is wholly beneficial." It is impossible to speak about all of the activity. But several striking things are worthy of note. For example, new instruments for the detection of radiation, a new gas detector and innovative isotope instruments for cancer treatment were developed here.

There are today six enterprises in TAMAD, and a new enterprise will soon be set up there for conversion of software, under the joint ownership of "Rotem" and "Digital." Shavit cannot hide his pride over this respectable partner. While searching for a source of employment for immigrants, he relates, the need was identified for adapting software to hardware, as the development of the hardware proceeds faster than the development of software. And what emerged? That the problem is worldwide, and the demand is tremendous.

So not only Zionism and employment for immigrants is part of this story, there is also a global market. When they looked for a strategic partner to get the thing off the ground, "Digital" showed great interest in it. "The field of computers is very suitable to immigrants," he explains. "They come with a not inconsiderable technical background. Some of them dream of more senior scientific work, but it is difficult for the state to offer that, and this kind of work does not embarrass the workers. This is not street cleaning." Shavit believes that "this will be a very, very special project." It is a fact that "Digital" was enthusiastic about the idea, and he sees in that an expression of belief.

Let us return to the incubator and to the scientists who are engrossed in their almost fantastic projects. Eighteen projects are now in stages of research. They were selected from approximately 200 proposals that were presented to the incubator. They include a machine that copies the contents of diskettes, which is in a very advanced stage. Another project, which sparks the imagination, and about which we are asked not to write much, is a drilling tool that can cut paper to thin metals without dust, shavings or remnants. A patent submission has already been made, and there are already potential clients, testifies Aryeh Sharon, the director-general of the incubator. According to him, the entire investment in the development of the incubator over two years, including the projects, comes to \$6 million. Of this amount, 85 percent comes from the chief scientist in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The rest comes from private entrepreneurs, from investors, and from donors.

The financing suffices only for the development stage. Even if a successful prototype is developed, the road to economic success is still long and depends on locating

additional investors, identifying strategic partners for establishing the enterprise, etc. Nevertheless, each project is organized as a limited company, and the scientist who works on the project receives a share in the company in addition to a monthly salary of IS 2,500. Each project is given two years, and after that it is on its own. And if someone needs a few more months to complete the project—they will not run him out.

According to Sharon, the attitude to failures will be forgiving and even sympathetic. Even failure yields something good, he says. In the worst case, the immigrant has become acquainted with Western knowledge, and he is now ready to succeed on the outside on his own. Also, the results are not wasted. Sometimes, a project that is "stuck" is continued thanks to unexpected solutions that come from other projects.

One problem troubles the people at TAMAD. The building of 6,400 square meters is filled to the last centimeter. The crowding makes current operations difficult. The sight of work positions in the corridors is reminiscent of the beds in the bursting corridors of the hospitals.

"From the viewpoint of occupancy—to our joy and our sorrow—it is full," says Shavit, adding that it was recently agreed that the "Mivney Ta'asiyya" Company build at its expense and on its initiative a new building of 5,000 square meters within seven months, which would almost double the existing space. Half of the building, which does not yet exist, has already been sold. In order to ease the crowding until the additional building is constructed, TAMAD has received, with the assistance of "Amidar" and the Ministry of Housing, 20 caravans, in which work stations will be set up.

But even this additional building will not be the final thing. The TAMAD industrial park is presenting a grandiose five-year plan, whose realization depends, of course, on money from the budget. According to the plan, an investment of approximately \$40 million will bring the built-up area to 50,000 square meters, where about 5,000 workers will be employed. The industrial park will include various enterprises in the fields of electro-optics, the development of special materials, the development of detection and identification instruments (GOZ), a delicate chemicals industry, computers, etc. Also to be established are a national center for developing lasers, a crystal development center, an ecological development center, and a tourist center, which will include a science and energy museum, a Bible city (an idea with which Miki Goldenberg, the brother of Dudu Topaz, has been running around for six years already), etc. Sounds fantastic? In TAMAD they specialize in turning fantastic ideas into reality.

General 'Uzi Dayan, New Command Profiled

91AE0641E Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT in Hebrew
30 Aug 92 pp 17,18

[Article by 'Ari'ela Ringel-Hofman: "A Real Dayan"]

[Text] The telephone did not stop ringing all Sabbath long at the home of the new Major General 'Uzi Dayan. Old friends called to congratulate him, and those who did not call, sent flowers. To be honest about it, the appointment really did not surprise anyone. Dayan's name was mentioned more than once during the last few months as a candidate for advancement, and the question was mainly what job he would accept.

When Dayan was about to complete his assignment as commander of a regular armored task force, some months ago, he got together for a chat with the Chief of Staff 'Ehud Baraq. Dayan indicated several jobs that he would like and told him what he was not interested in. The proposals that were then on the agenda—among them, to be commander of the quartermaster branch—he rejected.

At just that time Dayan opened another channel for a year of study at [?] Harvard. He got a stipend from there and looked into the possibility of getting his master's [degree] in public administration—a gentle way of hinting to whomever necessary that there was an alternative. The present appointment, senior commander in the Ground Forces Command, will postpone Harvard, although Dayan's record shows that he will almost certainly get there.

'Uzi Dayan is the fourth graduate of a General Staff patrol to receive the rank of general from 'Ehud Baraq. Preceding him were Dani Yatom, Nehemiah Tamri, and 'Amiram Levin. An old story, bathed in a sea of interpretation, except that it annoys the armor people every time all over again.

Dayan is getting an appointment similar to that gotten by generals 'Amiram Levin and Nehemiah Tamri. A significant portion of the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] battle strength is now under the command of those three graduates of the patrol.

The armor people cannot help but bring up the names of at least two brigadier generals who Dayan is the second man on the patrol to overtake. A veteran officer says that soon we are about to see a fifth man on the patrol appointed to the rank of major general.

'Uzi Dayan was a little more than two months old when his father, Zuriq Dayan, was killed in May 1948 in the War of Independence. Zuriq was the younger brother—the beloved brother, they say in the family—of Moshe Dayan. He was then 24 years old, a young officer who had only just completed the course. He was killed in the battle for Ramat Yohanan by Druze soldiers who came from Syria. It took four days before he could be reached and his body removed.

Nearly two years afterward 'Uzi's mother Mimi married Moshe Rabinovitch, a friend of Zuriq's, who was in the Palyam. Mimi—a graduate of one of the first Betzal'el courses and a professional jeweler who is still working—and Moshe made their home in Moshav Hayogev. They raised 'Uzi and two more children born to them, Dan and Mikhal. 'Uzi has always called Moshe, "Dad."

Hayogev is one of the more prosperous moshavim in the 'Emeq. To this day, when they talk in the moshav movement about well-fed children, they mean the children of Hayogev, Tel 'Adashim, Kfar Yehoshu'a, and the like. The young Dayan finished elementary school on the moshav and went to high school in an agricultural farm near 'Afula, where children of the moshavim studied together with students from the Youth 'Aliya boarding school. Even then, says an old friend, Dayan was an excellent student. That did not stop him, he says, from putting together Molotov cocktails in the lab and testing them in the field out back.

'Uzi, they say, loved poetry a lot and very much loved to sing. He was an awful faker, and they let him sing only because he always knew all the words. Even then, says one of those interviewed for this article, he had certain Dayan qualities that our parents talked about. A lone wolf in very little need of others. Proud, insensitive to the goings-on around him and at times, it would turn out, also very courageous.

'Uzi Dayan was drafted into the army in 1966 and went on a General Staff patrol. Before he was inducted, his mother met with 'Ezer Weizmann then Air Force commander. She was very worried, Weizmann says today, but did not stand in his way.

Dayan made the usual circuit and went to the officer course after those in his cycle. The truth is, they say in the unit, he was not one of those soldiers who, from the day of their call-up, clearly intend to make the military their career. When he finished the course, he returned to the patrol and was team commander. Those who remember him back then remember a team commander very dedicated to his troops, loved by his charges a lot more than by the rest of the soldiers in the unit.

He was very ambitious and, if necessary, also reckless. In the War of Attrition, when the unit was called to a particularly bold action on the other side of the Canal, a number of teams competed for the operation. Fairness required that the operation go to a more senior team. Dayan did not give up. I do not care how you do it, he told his team, but within minutes you will be on track. The rest I will take care of in the command. It may be, says one of the soldiers in the unit, that I would not choose to spend time with him on a lonely island, but I would follow him in battle.

When he finished his service, he was discharged and went to study mathematics and physics at the university. The Yom Kippur War caught him in Geneva, on a visit. He got on the first plane for Israel and spent the war in the unit. When the war ended, he stayed with the unit

and for several months replaced 'Amiram Levin, who was then the unit's deputy commander and had been wounded. Afterward he returned to his studies and completed his bachelor's [degree].

In 1976 he moved to armor for about 10 months and then went back to school. He earned a master's in Stanford in the United States, in the mathematics of operations research. His record, by the way, is very impressive in everything having to do with formal education. Unlike most army people, he gave up the wonderful privilege of completing the bachelor's (and sometimes even the master's) with a year and a half of history studies. In this aspect he is like 'Ehud Barak and Dani Yatom.

When he returned to Israel, in 1978, he became an armor battalion commander in the north. 'Uri 'Or was then task force commander; Yanush ben-Gal, the command general; and Rafa'el 'Eitan, the chief of staff. Dayan did not finish the job. Two accidents that occurred in the battalion he commanded cost him his job. A traffic accident and a training accident. In the training accident, a young officer from Ramat Hasharon who was then platoon commander, was killed. Raful removed Dayan, and Dayan went home. It seemed then that his military career had come to an end.

But in fact that did not happen. A little later he was offered command of General Staff patrol. According to the stories, his commanding officer supported the appointment. Yanush was vigorously opposed. Raful, who always had an ambivalent attitude toward the Dayan family, authorized it. Behind the scenes, they still say, 'Ezer Weizmann and Musa Feld put in a good word for the young Dayan. In any case, in the separation ceremony held in Dayan's honor in 1982, when he had completed his assignment, Raful gave a surprising speech, a song of praise to the outgoing commander. To this day, incidentally, the unit elders wonder if it was a matter of love for Dayan or a question of using the opportunity to close accounts with his predecessors in the job. Dayan made his peace with Yanush after he led the successful breakthrough to the Misgav-'Am children's house, in which three terrorists were holed up. The General Staff patrol got to the place after a failed breakthrough attempt by a Golani patrol. The General Staff patrol's penetration of the building ended with three dead terrorists and without any casualties to our forces.

Three days before the Lebanon War, 'Uzi Dayan married Tamar, today doctor of zoology at the University of Tel Aviv, and left with her for a honeymoon in Nahariya. From there, more or less, he was called to war. He did not have an official job and joined Barak's brigade, whose people he knew from his earlier service as battalion commander.

In the course of the war he was involved in a number of special operations, the publication of which is still prohibited.

At the end of the war he left Lebanon and went for a year of studies at the Institute for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv on the invitation of 'Aharon Yariv. In 1984 he returned to the army, was commander of a reserve brigade in the northern command, commander of a regular brigade in the southern command, commander of a reserve task force in the south, the same task force that 'Ariel Sharon had once commanded. Following that, he was appointed commander of a regular task force.

In between he was also head of the Armor Theory and Warfare Department of the Ground Forces Command, commander of a company commander's course, and commander of an armor battalion commander's course.

During his army service he went to live in the central part of the country. He is the father of two children, 'Iti and 'Iya.

According to one of the stories circulating in certain army circles, 'Uzi Dayan once got authorization to be interviewed for one of the midday papers. The meeting took place in the Zoological Institute where his wife works, and Dayan said that every time he walks around the General Staff, he has the feeling he is at his wife's institute, or something along those lines. That passage got to the IDF spokesman before it was published, and the latter actually begged the writer to pull it out, which in fact happened.

Starting this coming September, Dayan is to sit on that same staff. He is stubborn, introverted, proud and does not suffer fools, says one of his friends. But he will bring another good head to the General Staff and another very critical eye.

New Gun for Artillery Corps Being Examined

92AE0560B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jul 92
p 2

[Article by Major General Ben]

[Text] A committee headed by Planning Branch Chief Major General 'Amram Mitzna' has recommended that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] not procure the Sholef [known as the "Slammer," a 155-mm, 52 caliber self-propelled howitzer, as its future artillery armament]. The committee's recommendation reflects the attitude of many senior military leaders toward the Israeli gun project. Many senior IDF officers have called the Sholef "the best gun in the world," nonetheless adding in the same breath, "But we have no money to buy it."

Almost from its inception, the Sholef project has suffered from financing difficulties and an ambivalent attitude on the part of senior army officers. The latter have found it difficult to decide what to do with it. A different position on the Sholef emerged with each personnel change in the positions of chief of general staff, ground forces commander, and chief artillery officer. Several years ago, it was decided to complete

development of the gun, but no decision was made at that time to equip the IDF with it.

A decision on what will be the IDF's future artillery armament is expected in the coming months. In the past year, the Sholef project has been a main topic of internal debate in the defense establishment against the background of the difficult position of the gun's developer, Soltam Ltd., and deliberations concerning the IDF's multiyear plan and a request for hundreds of millions of shekels to renew the IDF's artillery disposition.

Former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, who wholeheartedly supported the defense industries' development and production efforts, was sympathetic toward the project and ordered the IDF to study procurement of the Sholef. He also ordered that money be injected into Soltam to complete the development of the gun's prototype.

As the completion of development proceeded, the defense establishment performed studies examining the Sholef's capabilities compared with other artillery weapons systems, especially the American Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS], which was praised in the Gulf War. The Sholef and the MLRS are designed for different missions. The Sholef provides continuous fire support for infantry and armored forces carrying out an assault. The MLRS is designed to level a fire strike against extensive areas at long range.

However, the IDF budget permits the procurement of only one system. Therefore, the Defense Ministry's Combat Means Development Administration was ordered to prepare a statistical study on the performance of the Sholef and the MLRS as a basis for future decisionmaking. After the study was completed, a more comprehensive study was done at the Systems Analysis Center of the IDF's Planning Branch, which indicated Sholef's superiority. This study was filed away as the result of pressure exerted by various people in the Army who rejected its conclusions completely. Subsequently, the Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak appointed Maj. Gen. Mitzna' to head a more senior committee, which recommended that existing guns be improved, and that the Sholef not be procured.

The initiative to develop the Israeli gun was that of Ya'akov Li'or, Soltam's general manager in the late seventies. Li'or believed that a new gun model could consolidate Soltam's future in the arms market. The gun which he proposed was based on technology developed by the Canadian engineer, Dr. Gerald Bull, who was shot to death in 1990 against the background of his involvement in the development of the Iraqi super gun. Foreign publications claimed that he was liquidated by the Israeli Mosad [Central Institute of Intelligence]. However, in the seventies Bull enjoyed good relations with Israel, even visiting the country several times.

Bull developed a new generation of guns which fired to ranges twice as long as models then in operational service: 40 kilometers versus 20 kilometers. The

improvements which he introduced to guns included changes in the barrel and gullet [space in the barrel aperture where the shell is placed when the weapon is loaded], and the development of ammunition having a better flight capability. Bull's ideas are applied to this day in guns developed and produced in Austria, South Africa, Germany, and Israel.

Li'or convinced the chief of general staff at the time, Refa'el Eytan, of the project's importance. The IDF had no money to invest in the project, but Soltam was willing to finance development based on the prospects it saw for future sales of the gun. It was agreed that Soltam would bear the costs of developing the gun's barrel and turret, and the defense establishment would pay for the gun's hull and trials, including ammunition and testing teams. The defense establishment's share in the project was financed from sources outside of the regular budget—from contributions to the Fund for the Sake of Israel's Security (LIBI Fund), and the Volunteer Fund for the Security of Israel (Entebbe Fund). The task of developing [a hull on which to mount the Sholef by modifying the Merkava tank hull] was assigned to the Merkava Tank Development Administration, which is headed by Assistant Defense Minister Maj. Gen. (reserves) Yisra'el Tal. A colonel coordinates the project within the Merkava Administration.

The gun's specifications, which took shape in the early eighties, give the gun unique features not found in other artillery armaments:

- **Survivability and mobility:** The Sholef is mounted on a Merkava tank hull and thus enjoys armor identical to that of the tank. This feature permits it—unlike existing guns which are built of aluminum and are not armored—to operate attached to assault forces. Also, the Merkava's drive system and tracks give the Sholef the Merkava's mobility and traversability.
- **Range:** the Sholef fires to a range which is double that of the M 109 [155-mm medium howitzer], the IDF's main artillery weapon.
- **Rapid firing:** the Sholef's automatic loading system permits it to fire at an especially high rate of fire.
- **Small crew:** the Sholef is operated by a crew of three, compared to six for the M 109.

In June 1983, the first shell was fired from the Sholef's barrel. In 1984, the first prototype was delivered for trials in the IDF. The second prototype was completed about two years later. The two guns have already fired thousands of shells in trials, and they have also participated in operational activity in Lebanon. They are operated by rotating crews of soldiers in regular service. Maintenance is performed by Soltam personnel.

Soltam's management has stated that the company has invested \$17 million of its own money in developing the gun to date. The defense establishment has invested a larger sum. At Soltam, it is estimated that a mass-produced Sholef—if the gun is indeed mass produced—will be priced at \$3.5 million. More than half of that

sum, \$2 million, would go to the Tank Maintenance and Refurbishment Center, where the Merkava is produced.

Not long ago, Soltam's general manager, Avraham Bar-David, who resigned from his position this week, said, "It is correct that our share is smaller. However, [the Sholef] is the acme of Soltam's technology. It is our chance to enter the future arms market and to export. If the IDF decides not to purchase the Sholef, it will have to purchase cannons abroad in several years, and it will lose the technology which we developed."

In May 1991, Soltam received 3.1 million shekels to complete the development of the first prototype. The Defense Ministry is drawing another 2 million shekels, approximately, for trials and maintenance. The Sholef's budget is controlled by the Tanks Administration, not by the IDF. At Soltam, it is estimated that work will end in early 1993, when the model of the Sholef will be submitted for final approval by technical examination personnel of the IDF Ordnance Corps. Soltam has threatened that, if the IDF decides not to procure the Sholef, the company will disband its professional team, which will make it more difficult to renew the project in the future. Soltam has received a permit to offer the Sholef's technologies for export. However, it is difficult to find customers for an armament which the IDF has not accepted.

In the Artillery Corps, there is a desire to equip the corps with several Sholef units. These units would be the spearhead of artillery and would enable artillery to be integrated in land battles attached to infantry combatants and tanks. However, in addition to the Sholef, the corps also wants the MLRS, and it knows that there is not enough money for both of them.

Physical Training Standards in IDF Discussed

92AE0653E YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
10 Sep 92

[Article by Dani Sadeh: "Let Someone Else Do the Running"]

[Text] "It is very sad that there are officers in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] who are incapable of performing fitness tests that are child's play," said a senior IDF officer yesterday, after it became known that 12 officers sent imposters to replace them in the fitness tests.

They are commanders in the combat alignment, who have been through oppressive training. Young commanders, who are incapable, or do not bother, to run 2 km or to undergo a firing test. And worst of all: this is a serious act of fraud.

The case exploded in the Navy, when 12 officers in the combat alignment were removed from their commands by the commander of the Navy, Major General Ami Ayalon. They committed a grave act, sending junior officers, their subordinates, to military fitness tests.

These tests are required for advancement, achieving a higher rank, and receipt of sports points at the PX.

It became evident that these were not isolated cases. During the course of the investigation by the military police, it became known that acts of this sort had been committed in other IDF units as well. Pampering, fraud, and taking the easy way out have apparently spread like a plague among IDF officers. "If commanders cheat," said a senior officer yesterday, "how can one rely on their reports of operative activity or any other activity by their unit? How can they relay credibility to their subordinates if they cheat their commanders?"

The grave act by the 12 officers was discovered by chance. One of the officers, a captain, who was a candidate for advancement and a raise in rank, sent a 1st lieutenant to replace him in a fitness test. When he arrived for the test, he was "discovered" by the testers, and a report was sent to the commander of the Navy.

Maj. Gen. Ami Ayalon, known for his strictness, did not conceal his fury. As an officer who had often been seen running with his subordinates, often overtaking them, back when he was the commander of the Navy commandoes, he understood that this was a serious incident that had to be addressed not only within the Navy, but also throughout the entire IDF.

Ayalon ordered an investigation by the investigative military police, and it then became apparent that another 11 officers were involved in the acts of fraud. All of them were junior officers, all of them were facing advancement, all of them were from the combat alignment of the Navy.

Ayalon decided to take extreme action, although it was clear to him that this step might hurt the operations of the combat alignment of the corps for a period of time. He decided to remove the officers from their positions. In the beginning of the week, Ayalon convened a meeting with the senior commander forum of the Navy, and gave them a report on the results of the investigation. Shortly afterward, he summoned the 12 officers and informed them of his decision.

At the same time, the military police passed its findings on to the Advocate General of the IDF, and instructions have already been issued regarding the preparation of indictments against those involved in the fraud. Several of them, it turns out, will be forced to end their military service, as well. Others, in addition to the judicial punishment, were given an additional punishment: for a period of at least one year, they will not be able to serve as commanders in the Navy.

The entire affair has raised many questions in the IDF, after it became evident that incidents of this sort have taken place in other corps, as well. The most penetrating question was: is something wrong with us? Is an officer in the combat alignment incapable of undergoing the combat fitness test? Is the test too difficult? To what depths can the evasion of responsibility reach?

The combat fitness tests for IDF officers, in their current form, were determined approximately three years ago by the former head of the Adjutant General Branch of General Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Ran Goren. This was done upon consultation with the head of the Combat Fitness Branch of the IDF.

According to army orders, every male and female officer up to age 40 must undergo the fitness tests once a year. Officers over the age of 32 must also undergo a medical examination. An officer who is incapable of taking the fitness test must submit a medical opinion that exempts him from these tests.

What does the test include?

The officers' fitness test includes a 2-km run, sit-ups, pull-ups, and a firing test, with an M-16 rifle or a Galil. The firing at the range is at a distance of 25 meters, and includes two rounds. The officers undergo the tests in work uniforms.

The female officers are subjected to slightly easier conditions. They can undergo the test in gym clothes. The test for female officers includes a 1,000-meter run and sit-ups for one minute. Those unable to pass the test undergo training workshops.

This is not a hard test, by any standard. Certainly not for officers, who have a high medical profile. Nonetheless, 12 officers found a way to evade these tests, even through fraud.

The IDF is treating the matter severely, and within a few days, a memorandum will be sent to all of the commanders, in which the importance of the fitness tests will be explained, as well as the graveness of the actions attributed to the officers who created the "stink".

[Box]

Every Physical Effort Seems Like a Punishment to Them

Much has been written about the poor physical fitness of new IDF soldiers. It turns out that this flaw starts during high school and continues throughout reserve duty.

A survey performed by Dr. David Ben Sira and Dr. Zvi Dudlazeck showed that approximately 70 percent of the

new recruits to the combat units of the IDF fail the combat fitness tests for these units. The survey examined 3,125 youths who were drafted into the IDF in August 1991.

The survey showed that approximately 48 percent of those drafted into the IDF do not train at all in preparation for military service. Only 11 percent train regularly, and the remainder train on an irregular basis for a short period prior to being drafted into the army. Their level of activity is insufficient. The poor physical level among the youth derives primarily from neglect in the schools.

"The failure of approximately 70 percent of those recruited into combat units of the IDF in the physical fitness tests is not surprising, but it is very worrisome," says the head of the Combat Fitness Branch of the Headquarters of the Chief Infantry and Paratroop Headquarters, Colonel Shlomo Ben Gal, following the findings of the survey.

Ben Gal maintains that there is a decrease in the physical fitness of the regular troops in the IDF as well, which exacerbates after their release from the army and their transfer to the reserve array.

"For years, we have been witnessing a decrease in the physical fitness of the average Israeli. Various studies done from time to time within the IDF and elsewhere are indicative of this," wrote Col. Ben Gal last year to then Deputy Minister of Education Pinhas Goldstein. "This statistic characterizes most of the youth prior to being drafted into the IDF, most of the regular troops during their service, as well as most of the young people after their compulsory service in the IDF. This phenomenon is greatly exacerbated among middle aged reservists."

According to Ben Gal, the decrease in physical fitness causes military tasks to be performed at a low level of functioning. This is manifested in all of the field units, in infantry, armor, gunnery, engineering corps, Air Force, and Navy tasks.

If so, the IDF has a problem. Most of the soldiers view any military task involving physical effort as a "punishment" to be evaded at any opportunity. These soldiers develop antibodies toward physical activity throughout their military service and afterwards, as well, as adults in reserve duty. [end box]

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161



This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.